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Abstract

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea establishes a
regime for the oceans that includes a number of "zones" in addition to the
traditional divisions of internal waters, territorial sea, and high seas. Although
explicitly applicable only in peacetime, these new zones have a spillover effect
on the law of naval warfare, particularly in the relationships between bel
ligerents and neutral States.
The spillover effect is most pronounced in the expanded territorial sea of
twelve nautical miles and in archipelagic States. Mechanical extension of rules
that were applicable to a narrow (three-nautical mile) territorial sea to these
broader areas of national jurisdiction is likely to create additional tensions
between neutrals and belligerents, perhaps widening the areas of conflict and
drawing neutrals into it. The study concludes that despite the dangers of such
a result, the developing law, as reflected in the military manuals of several
maritime States, seems to accept the old rules as applicable to the new and
expanded national zones in the oceans.

The "New" Law of the Sea
and

The Law of Anned Conflict at Sea.1
Horace B. Robertson, Jr.

I
Introduction

HE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION on the Law of the Sea? adopted
at the close of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III) in 1982, created what many conferees and others regard as
a new constitution for the oceans. Although it has not yet entered into force,3
and no major maritime State has ratified it, it has nevertheless had a profound
impact on the law of the sea. President Ronald Reagan, while announcing that
the United States would neither sign nor become a party to the Convention
because its provisions on the mining of the deep seabed were fatally flawed, at
the same time stated that, "'the convention also contains provisions with respect
to traditional uses of the oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law
and practice and fairly balance the interests of all states 4 The American Law

T

...

Institute, in its authoritative Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, went further, stating:
[B]y express or tacit agreement, accompanied by consistent practice, the
United States, and states generally, have accepted the substantive provisions
of the Convention, other than those addressing deep sea-bed mining, as
customary law binding upon them apart from the Convention.�
The features of the Convention that have had the most impact on the practice
of States are the new or expanded jurisdictional zones6 recognized in the
Convention. These include the twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea, the twenty
four-nautical-mile contiguous zone, the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic
zone (EEZ), the greatly expanded continental shelf, and archipelagic waters, all
of which have in one way or another reduced the areas in which high seas
freedoms may be exercised. A new regime for international straits-transit
passage-is also an important development.
Although, as will be developed below, the differentiation of an area of the ocean
that is subject to the territorial sovereignty of the coastal state-the territorial
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sea-had its origin in the practices of States in time of war-specifically in their
assertions as neutrals that acts of hostilities should not take place close to their
shores-the jurisdictional areas that are a part of the current law of the sea have
been developed primarily for the protection of peacetime interests and are
regarded as basically a peacetime regime. Nevertheless, by defining the areas
that are subject to coastal State sovereignty or the exercise of other forms of
jurisdiction, this regime may have significant effect on the exercise of both
belligerent and neutral rights during time of armed conflict.7 As stated by
Professor Bernard H. Oxman:
To the extent one continues to divide public international law into the two
classic categories-the laws of war and the laws of peace-the Convention
on the Law of the Sea would doubtlessly fall within the latter category. This
is so in the sense that the rules of anned conflict and neutrality are not
addressed by the Convention.
At the same time, the Convention does contain rules for dividing the oceans
into different jurisdictional zones. Some of the rules of warfare and neutrality
vary with the status of geographic areas. The integration of the new reg imes
of the law of the sea with the rules of naval and air warfare is accordingly a
subject that merits attention. The classic dichotomy in the law of the sea
between internal waters and the territorial sea on the one hand, and the high
seas on the other, has yielded to new subtleties and modalities, particularly
in the regimes of straits, archipelagic waters, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental s helf .!

As suggested by Professor Oxman, the most significant effect of the new
jurisdictional zones will be upon the rules of neutrality, where the relationship
between neutrals and belligerents and the applicability of rules depends on the
particular jurisdictional area in which hostile activities take place. For that
reason, this paper concentrates principally on the effect that the establishment
or recognition of new jurisdictional zones may have on the law of neutrality.
Although some publicists have questioned the continued viability of the
concepts of belligerency and neutrality in light of the adoption of the United
Nations Charter and the limitations it has placed on the use of armed force,9 as
experience in the two recent Persian Gulf conflicts demonstrate, there is no
other body of law that deals adequately with the relationships between states
that are party to the conflict and those that choose not to take part in it. As
Professor Christopher Greenwood has stated:
[T]he law of neutrality still provides the only body of rules sufficiently precise
and detailed to regulate such matters as rights to intercept shipping. The
casualties amongst "neutral" shipping in the Gulf [Iraq-Iran] conflict il
lustrate the need for a detailed body of rules on this subject and the inadequacy
of attempts to deal with such matters simply by reference to the broad
10
principles of self-defence.

2

Accordingly, I shall use the terms "belligerent" and "neutral" to describe
respectively those States that are involved in an anned conflict and those that
are not taking part in the anned conflict.

II
A Brief History of the Origins and
ll
Development of "Zones" in the Oceans
The history of the law of the sea is a history of the tensions between coastal
states seeking to exercise jurisdiction over or special interests in ocean waters
lapping their shores and other states seeking to exercise freedoms of navigation,
12
fishing, and other common interests in the oceans.
Roman law recognized the doctrine of freedom of the seas, although it
remains unclear whether the freedoms embraced in the doctrine applied to all
13
or just to Roman citizens. With the breakup of the Holy Roman Empire and
the creation of numerous city-states and principalities in Europe, those bound
ing the seas laid claim to vast expanses of the oceans, asserting exclusive rights
of navigation and fishing within them and exacting tribute from the ships of
14
other states that wished to sail "their" waters. The trend toward national claims
over vast expanses of the oceans reached its apogee near the end of the fifteenth
century when Pope Alexander VI, in 1493, divided the then-known oceans of

5

the world between Spain and Portugal. 1 A year later, in the Treaty of Tordesil

las, Spain and Portugal confinned this arrangement, each claiming for itself a

monopoly of navigation and commerce within its respective sphere. 16

Even England, that later bastion of the freedom of the seas, laid claims to the
seas that washed the British Isles during the reigns of the Plantagenet and Stuart
monarchs, although the intervening Tudor Elizabeth actively opposed "the
17
exclusive maritime sovereignty arrogated by Venice, Portugal, or Spain:'
The shrinking of these expansive claims began with the great juridical
debates about

mare liberum

and

mare clausum

that occurred in the early

seventeenth century. The most influential voice in these debates was that of
Grotius, who, in 1609, published

Mare Liberum,1 8

in which he argued for the

right of the Dutch to trade in the East Indies, where the Portuguese claimed a
monopoly on the right of trade and navigation flowing from the Papal Bull and
Treaty of Tordesillas. Grotius' arguments for the freedom of the seas and
against the acquisition of property rights in the oceans were repeated and refmed
in his more extensive work,

The Law of War and Peace,19

published in 1625.

Grotius' books went unchallenged by Portuguese and Spanish publicists,
against whose claims they were specifically directed, but they struck a nerve in
England, where Welwood and later Selden undertook the defense of the Stuart
monarchs' pretensions to dominion over the "British seas" (the extent of which
were never clearly defined), particularly with respect to the right to exclude

3
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Dutch fishennen and the practice of requiring the striking of the flag to British
2
men-of-war in those seas. 0
England continued to asse rt its dominion over "British seas" during the Stuart
monarchies (1603- 17 14) as well as during the Interregnum period of the
Commonwealth and Protectorate (1649- 1659). The Scandinavian States made
similar claims to the waters of the Baltic and the western seas between the
Scandinavian States and Iceland and Greenland. The main opponent of these
extravagant claims was the United Provinces (the Dutch), whose international
commerce and fishing fleets predominated during that period. Their resistance
to British demands for the striking of topsails and flag in the presence of British
men-of-war and their insistence on the right of their fishing fleet to fish in
"British seas" precipitated three naval wars with England during the seven
teenth century. At various times during these tumultuous times of shifting
alliances the Dutch were joined by France and other continental powers.
During these same times, however, the embryo of the concept of a territorial
2l
sea began to take shape. Grotius himself had addressed only the vast expanses
of the oceans, and he recognized that some enclosed and narrow parts of the
sea might be subjected to control from the adjacent land territory. Later, as
stated by Fulton:
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries another principle was
gradually evolved, and was ultimately accepted as furnishing such a natural
basis, so that it may now be regarded as an established part of international
law. It was, that the maritime dominion of a state ended where its power of
asserting continuous possession ended. The belt of sea along the coast which
could be commanded and controlled by artillery on shore thus came to be
regarded as the territorial sea belonging to the contiguous state. Beyond the
range of guns on shore the sea was common.22
The evolution of this principle owes its origins to the law of neutrality, where
prize courts held that the prizes taken within the range of guns of a neutral fort
23
were not "good prize" and were restored to their owners. It was reinforced by
the practice of vessels rendering a salute when they came within the range of
2
the artillery of a foreign fort. 4 At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the
Dutch jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek "transferred in theory to all parts of a
coast this decisive property of compulsion and dominion which, strictly speak
2
ing, only existed where forts or batteries were placed. ,, 5 Bynkershoek's prin
ciple became known as the "cannon-shot rule," and since the range of cannon
in Bynkershoek's era was about three nautical miles or one marine league, it
became the equivalent of a three-nautical-mile territorial sea. Although
Bynkershoek's theory did not receive immediate universal acceptance, it did,
over the next century, become "incorporated into international law as the rule
for fixing the boundary of the territorial waters. 26 The causes for this gradual
,,
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acceptance of a narrow band of territorial sea along the coast were, according
to Fulton, twofold:
One was the moral and material victory of the Dutch Republic in its long and
persistent struggle against the exorbitant claims to maritime dominion, first
of Spain and Portugal, and then of England and Denmark. The other was the
great extension of commerce and navigation, in which England secured an
ever-increasing share, so that in the [eighteenth] century we find her taking
the part of Holland in opposition to the Danish claims to mare clausum. As
maritime commerce extended and the security of the sea became established,
.it was felt more and more that claims to a hampering sovereignty and
jurisdiction were incompatible with the general welfare of nations; and as the
states interested in this commerce had the greatest power, the assertion of a
wide dominion was gradually abandoned, surviving only in remote regions
or in enclosed seas like the Baltic.27
For whatever reasons (and international-law scholars are not always in
agreement as to what they are), by the end of the eighteenth century or early in
the nineteenth century there was international acceptance of the idea that a
nation's territorial sea was constituted by a uniform band along its coast,
8
generally considered to be three nautical miles in width. 2 By the end of the
nineteenth century, of course, the range of cannon greatly exceeded three
nautical miles, but despite the assertions of many publicists as to the illogic of
preservation of a principle whose underlying theoretical basis was outdated,29
the principle remained essentially intact until the end of World War II. As stated
by Jessup, "it remained because the nations found it a convenient compromise
between conflicting interests. ,,30
During this same period there developed also a legal regime ofthe territorial
sea as well as a generally accepted rule as to its breadth. Despite varying theories
that existed in the nineteenth century as to the nature of the territorial sea
(sovereignty, jurisdiction, bundle of servitudes, etc.), by the early twentieth
century, "scarcely any author took issue with the notion that the territorial sea
1
is subject to sovereignty.,,3 This theory of sovereignty was confirmed by
national practice and codifications of the 1920s as well as the preparatory work
for the Hague Codification Conference of 1930,32 the International Law
Commission's Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea,33 and the 1958 Geneva
4
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone? This principle is
carried forward into the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, which provides, inter alia, in article 2, that, "The sovereignty of a coastal
State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters ... to an adjacent
belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. ,,35
The sovereignty exercised by the coastal State over its territorial sea is the
same as for its land areas and internal waters save for the right of ships of other
nationalities to pass through the territorial sea in the exercise of the right of
5
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36
innocent passage in time of peace. Whether innocent passage includes the
right of warships to pass without prior notification or consent in time of peace,
and the extent of permissible regulation or suspension of innocent passage in
37
time of war, will be examined below.
Concurrently with the development of the law of the territorial sea, a number
of States also asserted certain rights more limited than full sovereignty in areas
of the oceans beyond the narrow territorial sea. These took a number of forms
and were extended to various distances from shore. Until all such acts were
repealed in 1876, Great Britain had several laws (commonly referred to as
"hovering acts") extending jurisdiction for enforcement of customs and excise
38
laws to as much as four leagues (twelve nautical miles) from shore. As early
as 1799 the United States had similar laws applicable to ships bound for United
States ports, and in several cases the United States Supreme Court recognized
the lawfulness of the enforcement of similar rights by other States beyond the
39
limits of the territorial sea. Russia, France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain had
similar laws extending to varying distances beyond three miles, as did the
40
Scandinavian States. Several South American States adopted zones extending
41
to twelve nautical miles for fiscal, revenue, and security purposes.
Great
Britain, having repealed the last of its "hovering acts" in 1876, strongly
contested the right of other States to enforce such laws. It was joined by a
number of other States in protesting the United States' pretensions to enforce
42
its anti-liquor laws beyond the three-mile limit during the Prohibition Era. For
these reasons, as well as the lack of uniformity both as to the content and outer
limits for zones of special jurisdiction, it is difficult to conclude that the right
to establish such zones had become a part of customary intemational law, at
least until 1958 when the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone recognized the contiguous zone for the purposes of preventing infringe
ments of a coastal State's customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regula
43
tions.
Although a number of States at various times claimed the exclusive right to
exploit the fishery resources off their shores beyond the territorial sea or at least
44
to regulate their exploitation, such a right was not recognized in customary
4s
international law,
even though as Fulton states, the three-mile limit "was
selected, not on any grounds special to fisheries, but because it had been already
recognised and put into force in connection with the rights of neutrals and
belligerents in time of war. . .. [I]ts application to the right of fishing is
accidental and arbitrary 46
...

At the conclusion of the Second World War, then, the only area of the ocean
as to which it might be said that a coastal State had an undisputed right under
international law to exercise jurisdiction and control was the territorial sea. Any
rights beyond that outer boundary were subject to dispute unless contained in
a treaty. At that point in time, therefore, the oceans were divided into three

6

distinct areas-(1) internal waters, that is, waters inside the baseline, (2) the
territorial sea of a breadth of three nautical miles over which the coastal State
exercised full sovereignty except for the right of innocent passage by surface
ships of other States, and (3) the high seas, which included all other waters of
the oceans, in which aU States were entitled to the freedoms of the high seas,
which included, inter alia, the freedoms of navigation, fishing, scientific
research, and laying of undersea cables and pipelines, and in time of war, the
right of belligerents to conduct hostilities in accordance with the law of anned
conflict at sea.
The event which triggered the demise of this tripartite division of the oceans
and resulted ultimately in today's multiple and overlapping zones of coastal
state jurisdiction was President Harry Truman 's Proclamation of the United
States 's claim to jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the seabed
47
and subsoil of the continental shelf of the United States. The outer boundary
of the continental shelf was not defined in the Proclamation, but an accompany
ing White House Press release stated that generally the continental shelf
extended to a point at which the depth of the water was 100 fathoms (600 feet).48
Although the Proclamation carefully delimited the extent of the claim and
explicitly affinned that "[t]he free and unimpeded navigation of the high seas
above the continental shelf and rights under international law with respect to
free swimming fish are in no way thus affected," this unilateral claim by the
then-preeminent maritime power and one of the leading exponents of the
freedom of the high seas opened the door for wider and more comprehensive
unilateral claims by other states. The broadest of these were claims by several
Central and South American States to extend their territorial seas to a breadth
of 200 nautical miles. The relative unifonnity and tranquility which had existed
for about 150 years with respect to the law of the sea began to erode. The era
of "creeping jurisdiction" had begun.
Concurrently, the International Law Commission (ILC) began its studies
leading ultimately to the development of a draft convention on the law of the
sea. In its successive drafts of articles on the law of the sea prior to the convening
of the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958, the ILC
was unable, however, to agree on a breadth of the territorial sea. In the articles
produced at its Eighth Session, which served as the negotiating text for the 1958
Conference, the article on the breadth of the territorial sea provided as follows:
Article

3

1. The Commission recognizes that international practice is not unifonn
as regards the delimitation of the territorial sea.
2. The Commission considers that international law does not pennit an
extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles.
3. The Commission, without taking any decision as to the breadth of the

7

The Newport Papers

territorial sea up to that limit, notes, on the one hand, that many States have
fixed a breadth greater than three miles and, on the other hand, that many
States do not recognize such a breadth when that of their own territorial sea
is less.
4. The Commission considers that the breadth of the territorial sea should
be fixed by an international conference.49
Although the first UN Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted four
conventions on the law of the sea, one of which was the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,50 the conferees were unable to agree on
an article establishing the breadth of the territorial sea, primarily because of the
wide disagreement as to whether States could exercise exclusive control over
fisheries in a zone beyond the limits of the territorial sea. Consequently, in its
next session, the United Nations General Assembly voted almost unanimously
to convene a Second Conference in 1960 exclusively "for the purpose of
considering further questions of the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery
l
Iimits.,, 5 This Second Conference also failed to reach agreement on the breadth
of the territorial sea, rejecting by a one-vote margin a compromise proposal
sponsored jointly by the United States and Canada for a six-mile territorial sea
2
with an additional six-mile exclusive fishery zone beyond that. 5
The 1958 Conference did, however, succeed in reaching agreement on the
contiguous zone which prior to the Conference had been disputed. 53 Article 24
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous zone provides, inter

alia, as follows:
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal
State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its
territory or territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
The article adopted by the Conference was identical to that proposed by the
ILC in its final draft except for the addition of the word "immigration" in
paragraph l(a). The ILC's Commentary on its draft article includes the follow
ing comments:
(1) International law accords States the right to exercise preventive or
protective control for certain purposes over a belt of the high seas contiguous
to their territorial sea. It is, of course, understood that this power of control
does not change the legal status ofthe waters over which it is exercised. These
waters are and remain a part of the high seas and are not subject to the
sovereignty of the coastal State, which can exercise over them only such
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rights as are conferred on it by the present draft or are derived from interna
tional treaties. S4

Significantly, the Commission added the following commen t :
(4) The Commission did not recognize special security rights in the
contiguous zone. It considered that the extreme vagueness of the term
"security" would open the way for abuses and that the granting of such rights
was not necessary. The enforcement of customs and sanitary regulations will
be sufficient in most cases to safeguard the security of the State. In so far as
measures of self-defence against an imminent and direct threat to the security

of the State are concerned, the Commission refers to the general principles
of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.ss

The Convention also gave treaty recognition to the continental shelf doctrine,
providing that coastal States exercise "sovereign rights" over the shelf for the
purpose of "exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. ,,56 The outer limit
was defined as the point at which the water depth reached "200 meters or,
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superj acent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas. ,,57
Finally, the 1958 Convention incorporated into its provisions the principles
enunciated by the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case58 for the adoption of straight
baselines for portions of the coast which are marked by deep indentations or a
fringe of coastal islands. Although these provisions result in only modest
expansions of the national waters of a coastal State when the criteria for their
use are appropriately applied, the p racti ce of States since 1958 demonstrates a
constant increase in their application to coastlines that do not fit the criteria, as
well as expansive abuses of the criteria in situations where they may arguably
be applicable. 59 The result has been to incorporate large areas that were
fonnerly high seas into the internal waters or territorial seas of coastal States.
In some cases, the adoption of straight baselines results in the appropriation of
much larger areas of the high seas than would an increase of the breadth of the
territorial sea to twelve miles or more.
Following the failure of the Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea,
the three-mile territorial sea began to lose adherents. Figure 1 summarizes the
status of the claims of states to various breadths of the terri torial sea from 1945
to the present. By 1965, the three-mile claim had bec ome a minority position
with twelve miles being almost as common; by 1974, shortly after the openin g
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
twelve-mile adherents outnumbered three-mile adherents almost 2 to 1. The
erosion of consensus as to what was the proper breadth of the territorial sea was
one of the motivating factors for calling the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea.
9
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The Expansion of Territorial Sea Claims
1945

Claims National

1958

1965

1974

1979

1983

1991

3 NM

46

45

32

28

23

25

9

4-11 NM

12

19

24

14

7

6

5

26

54

76

78

112

12 NM

2

9

OVER 12 NM

.Jl

....2

....3.

....2Q

....2.S.

....3.Q

-1.2

Number of Coastal or

60

75

85

116

131

139

145

Island Nations

Figure 1
Source: U.S. Department of the Navy

III
The Status of Maritime Zones in the
Current Law of the Sea
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS ill)

met from 1973 to 1982 and produced the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. Although the Convention has not yet entered into force, its
provisions concerning traditional uses of the oceans are widely considered as
60
reflective of customary international law. The provisions of the Convention
which are most likely to have an impact on the law of anned conflict at sea are
the following:
• States may establish the breadth of their territorial sea up to a limit not

exceeding twelve nautical miles (article 3).

• States may draw straight baselines using the same criteria adopted in the

1958 Territorial Sea Convention (article 7).

• States may establish a contiguous zone beyond their territorial sea over

which they exercise a limited jurisdiction for the prevention of infringement of
its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations with an outer
limit no more than twenty-four nautical miles from the baseline (article 33);
• States may establish an exclusive economic zone

(EEZ)

beyond and

adjacent to the territorial sea out to a limit of 200 nautical miles from the
baseline; in the EEZ they have "sovereign rights" for the purpose of exploring
and exploiting, conserving and managing the living and non-living natural
resources of the seabed and subsoil and superjacent waters; in the EEZ they also
exercise jurisdiction as provided in other provisions of the Convention with
regard to establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures,
marine scientific research, and the protection and preservation of the marine

environment (articles 55-57). Other States "enjoy" within the EEZ the freedoms
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of navigation and overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, "and
other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as
those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and
pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention" (article
58). Both the coastal State and other States are required, in exercising their
rights in the EEZ, to have "due regard" for the rights of the other States and
coastal States respectively (articles 56 and 58).
• The outer boundary of the continental shelf is extended to 200 nautical
miles from the baseline for all States, and for States with continental margins
wider than 200 miles, to the edge of the margin according to a formula provided
in the Convention, but in no case more than 350 nautical miles from the baseline
or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 meter isobath (article 76).
• Straits embraced by the territorial sea of one or more States but used for
international navigation between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another
part of the high seas or an EEZ are governed by the right of "transit passage,"
which permits "the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose
of continuous and expeditious passage of the strait." Such passage may not be
suspended (article 44), and passage may be made in the ship or aircraft's
"normal mode" of operation (articles 37 and 38). Straits that have a ribbon of
high seas or EEZ through them or are formed by an island and its mainland are
not governed by the transit-passage regime if the high seas or EEZ route or the
route seaward of the island is "of similar convenience with respect to naviga
tional and hydrographical characteristics" (articles 36 and 37). The regime for
these latter categories of straits, and for straits leading to the territorial sea of a
foreign State, is innocent passage (non-suspendable in the cases of island-main
land straits and straits leading to the territorial sea of a foreign State)(article
45). In addition, the regimes for straits "regulated in whole or in part by
long-standing international conventions in force specifically relating to such
straits" are unaffected by the straits provisions of the Convention (article 35(c)).
• States which are comprised solely of islands or parts of islands, which
form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, and which meet
certain criteria as to land-to-water ratio and distance of separation may draw
straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago (Articles 46 and 47). The waters
inside the baselines become "archipelagic waters" (article 49), and the territorial
sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf are
measured outward from these archipelagic baselines (article 48). The ar
chipelagic State exercises sovereignty over archipelagic waters, their seabed
and subsoil, and the airspace above, regardless of their depth or distance from
the coast (article 49). All States have the right of "archipelagic sea lanes
passage" (which is equivalent to "transit passage" through straits) through
archipelagic sea-lanes designated by the archipelagic State or in the absence of
11
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such designation through the routes nonnally used for international navigation.
For other areas of archipelagic waters, the ships of all States have the right of
innocent passage.
• The unrestricted freedoms of the high seas are exercised only from the
outer limit of the exclusive economic zone rather than from the outer limit of
the territorial sea (article 86). The area for the exercise of full high seas freedoms
has thus been reduced by the subtraction of those areas that comprise the EEZ.
If all coastal and island States claim an EEZ of 200 miles, this will reduce the
area of the high seas by approximately one-third. As outlined above, however,
the freedoms of navigation and overflight and the freedoms to lay cables and
pipelines are preserved in the EEZ subject to the right of those exercising them
to have "due regard" for the legitimate activities of the coastal state in its EEZ.
• The Convention creates an international seabed "Area," which is defined
as "the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction" (article 1). In effect, the "Area" comprises all of the seabed beyond
the outer edge of the juridical continental shelf. Unlike the other zones discussed
above, the "Area" is not subject to national jurisdiction or control but is regarded
by the LOS Convention as the "common heritage of mankind" (article 135).
Part XI of the Convention provides a regime and institutions for the purpose of
exploration and exploitation of its mineral resources. Although Part XI has not
been received into customary law as have the other Parts of the Convention, the
"Area" will be briefly discussed in subsection V.G. below.
The effect of the adoption of the 1982 Convention and absorption into
customary intemational law of many of its provisions is to replace the three-fold
division of the ocean (internal waters, a narrow territorial sea, and the high seas)
with a multiplicity of broad and overlapping coastal areas under varying measures
of jurisdiction and control by the contiguous states and a much reduced area of
high seas. These divisions of the ocean are depicted in Figure 2.

IV
The Law of Armed Conflict at Sea and the
Traditional Areas of the Oceans
In order to understand how the emergence of new maritime areas may affect
the law of anned conflict at sea, which has traditionally been conducted in
oceans which juridically consisted of only three divisions-internal waters,
territorial waters (territorial sea), and high seas-it is necessary to understand
how this trifold division of the oceans affected the conduct of operations before
the manifold and overlapping divisions of the present era were created.
The essential overarching principles could be stated as follows:
• First, the areas within which belligerents could conduct hostile operations
were the high seas (which, it is to be remembered, consisted of all parts of the
12
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oceans beyond the territorial sea), the territorial sea and internal waters of
belligerents, and the airspaces above these areas.

• Second, the obverse of the first principle-as a general rule, hostile

operations could not be conducted in the internal waters or territorial sea of a
61
neutral State, nor in the airspace above these divisions of the oceans.

• Third, the neutral State is required to apply its neutrality regulations
62
impartially to all belligerents engaged in the conflict.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these general principles
were fleshed out by the practice of States into a set of generally agreed upon
and rather formal rules of conduct. Most of them were codified in the Second
Hague Peace Conference as the 1907 Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights
63
and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War. Although Hague XIII has not
received universal ratification, and a number of important States, including the
United Kingdom, have never ratified it, most of its provisions are considered
64
In any event, it comprises the latest
to be declaratory of customary law.
expression in treaty form of the respective rights and duties of neutrals and
belligerents with respect to hostile activities within neutral "maritime territory"
(that is, internal waters and the territorial sea) and may be used as a starting
point for discussion of these issues.
The provisions of Hague XIII concerning the respective rights and obliga
tions of belligerents and neutrals in neutral maritime territory that are most
likely to be affected by the replacement of the singular coastal zone of the
territorial sea with the multiplicity of coastal zones resulting from the

1982

United Nations Convention are outlined below. Since ports are normally within
internal waters, which are unaffected by the creation of additional zones beyond
the territorial sea, I have not included the provisions of Hague XIII dealing
solely with ports. On the other hand, roadsteads may be within either internal
waters or the territorial sea and thus may be affected by the extension of the
breadth of the territorial sea to twelve miles or the drawing of straight baselines.
Accordingly, those provisions of Hague XIII dealing with "roadsteads" are
included. The significant provisions of the Convention are as follows:
Belligerents are required to respect the sovereign rights of neutral States and
to abstain from acts that would constitute a violation of neutrality (article

1);

Any act of hostility, including visit, search and capture by a warship in the
territorial sea of a neutral power is a violation of neutrality (article 2);
A neutral State must employ the "means at its disposal" to release a prize
captured within its territorial sea (article 3);
A prize court cannot be set up by a belligerent on neutral territory or on a
vessel in neutral waters (article 4);
Belligerents cannot use neutral ports or waters as a base of operations nor
erect any apparatus to communicate with belligerent forces at sea (article 5);
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A neutral Government must employ the "means at its disposal" to prevent
the fitting out or arming of vessels within its jurisdiction which it believes are
intended for cruising or engaging in hostile operations and to prevent departure
from its jurisdiction of such vessels (article 8);
A neutral State must apply its rules and restrictions impartially to the
belligerents and may forbid the entry of vessels which have violated its rules
or its neutrality (article 9);
The "mere passage" of belligerent warships or prizes through a neutral's
territorial sea does not affect the neutral's neutrality (article 10);
A neutral power may allow belligerent warships to employ its pilots (in its
territorial waters65)(article 11);
Unless the neutral's regulations provide otherwise, belligerent warships may
remain in neutral ports, roadsteads or territorial waters no more than 24 hours
(article 12);66
A neutral Power must notify a belligerent warship within its ports, roadsteads
or territorial waters at the outbreak of hostilities to depart within 24 hours or
such other period as required by the neutral's regulations (article 13);
A belligerent warship may not prolong its stay in a neutral port except on
account of damage or stress of weather and must depart as soon as the cause of
delay is at an end (article 14);
In neutral ports and roadsteads belligerent warships may carry out only
repairs that are necessary to make them seaworthy. The local authorities may
decide what repairs are necessary (article 17);67
Belligerent warships may not use neutral ports, roadsteads, or territorial
waters for replenishing their supplies of war material or armament or for
completing their crews (article 18);
In neutral ports or roadsteads belligerent vessels may revictual only to the
peacetime standard and receive fuel only in sufficient quantity to reach the
nearest port of their own country or fill their bunkers, if the latter is the formula
adopted in the neutral's regulations (article 19). They may not make a repeat
visit for refueling at the port of a neutral in any of whose ports they have refueled
for the previous three months (article 20);
A neutral State must exercise such surveillance "as the means at its disposal
allow" to prevent violation of its territorial waters (article 25); and
The exercise of its rights under the Convention by a neutral cannot be
considered an unfriendly act by a belligerent (article 26).
To reemphasize a point already made, when the Convention uses the term
"neutral waters" or waters "within its jurisdiction," or similar terms, it is
referring either to the internal waters or the territorial waters (territorial sea) of
the neutral State, since those were the only areas of the oceans recognized at
that time as being within the jurisdiction or sovereignty of the coastal State.
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V
The Impact of Changes in Jurisdictional Zones
upon the Law of Neutrality

A. The Territorial Sea.

As developed above, the concept of the territorial sea

originated with the claims of neutral States to prevent belligerent hostile
activities from occurring close to their shores, and the breadth of the territorial
sea was originally tied to the actual area that a coastal State could control from
its shore, i. e., the range of shore-based artillery or three nautical miles. Although
the range of cannon soon exceeded this short distance, the rights and duties of
neutral and belligerent States in the offshore areas bounding neutral coastal
States remained tied to the three-mile breadth of the territorial sea. The series
of compromises which resulted in the rules which eventual1y became embedded
in the law of neutrality were thus based on the assumption that they would apply
only in a very narrow coastal margin, measured from baselines which cor
responded to the low-water line along the coast.
The territorial sea now has a breadth of up to twelve miles, and while the
nonnal baseline is still the low-water line along the coast, many coastal States
claim the right to draw straight baselines in a manner that extends the outer
boundary of the territorial sea many miles more than twelve miles from the
actual coast. (Although the waters inside these exaggerated baselines become
internal waters, the right of innocent passage is preserved through them where
68
they enclose areas which had previously not been considered as internal.) The
combined effect of increasing the breadth of the territorial sea and allowing the
use of straight baselines is thus to more than quadruple the area of the waters
subject to coastal state sovereignty. This in turn raises the question of the
continued applicability of all the rules summarized above to this broader band
along a neutral's coast.
Dr. Elmar Rauch, in his study of the issue, has no difficulty in concluding,
without discussion, that the same rules apply in this expanded territorial sea that
fonnerly applied in the narrow territorial sea. He states:
As a matter of principle belligerents are bound to respect the sovereignty
of neutral powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters [by
which he means the territorial sea and internal waters] from any act of
warfare. Any act of hostility, including capture and the exercise of the right
of search, committed by belligerent warships in the territorial waters of a
neutral power, constitutes a violation of neutrality and is strictly forbidden.69
Dr. Rauch may well be correct that such a conclusion can be drawn without
further analysis. His conclusion is bolstered by the recently published United
States Navy operational law manual, which explicitly accepts the idea that
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extension of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles does not affect the
application of the laws of neutrality, stating:
[l1he 12-nautical mile territorial sea is not, in and of itself, incompatible with
the law of neutrality. Belligerents continue to be obliged to refrain from acts
of hostility in neutral waters and remain forbidden to use the territorial sea of
a neutral nation as a place of sanctuary from their enemies or as a base of
70
operations.
•

72
The Canadian71 and Gennan draft manuals, both of which were prepared
subsequent to the adoption of the twelve-mile territorial sea, state without
comment that any hostile acts within neutral territorial seas are prohibited.
It, of course, goes without citation that internal waters and the territorial sea
are subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State, save only for the right of
innocent passage in the territorial sea, and that the cardinal principle of the law
of neutrality is that belligerents may not conduct hostilities in neutral territory,
land or sea. Nevertheless, one may question whether rules which were
developed to apply to a narrow band of water along a neutral's coast should be
applied automatically to a band that may be more than four times as wide. As
outlined above, neutral States have an obligation to use the means at their
disposal to conduct surveillance of their waters to ensure that belligerents do
not violate their neutrality and to take preventive or corrective action if they
73
detect such violations. A broader territorial sea presents a greater burden of
surveillance and enforcement for the neutral State as well as a greater temptation
for belligerent naval forces, especially submarines, to use neutral waters as
"safe corridors" for passage to or from legitimate areas of hostilities, for transit
to or from home ports, or as safe havens for rendezvous with replenishment
ships. If neutral States are unable or unwilling to carry out their obligations to
prevent such activities, the opposing belligerent may legitimately take hostile
action against the enemy forces that are unlawfully using the neutral's territorial
74
sea. Such actions would tend to embroil the neutral in the anned conflict rather
than isolate it from such actions, which, of course, is the purpose of the law of
neutrality. The passage of the A Itmark through the Norwegian territorial sea in
15
World War 11, as well as Great Britain's claim that Gennan submarines were
using the same sea as a thousand-mile-Iong "covered way" for passage of their
76
submarines from home ports to operational areas in the open seas
are
examples of how even a narrow territorial sea may tempt belligerents to test the
limits of tolerance of both neutrals and opposing belligerents to the use of
neutral territorial seas for safe havens from attack. Increasing the breadth of the
territorial sea more than four-fold would undoubtedly vastly increase such
temptations.
77
In time of peace, the ships of all States, including warships, have the right
of innocent passage through the territorial seas of all States. In time of war,
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neutrals may, if they choose, allow "mere passage" of belligerent warships
through their territorial seas without jeopardizing their neutral status. 78 On the
other hand, neutrals may, if they choose, close their territorial seas except for
those parts leading to an international strait to passag e by belligerent warships ?9
The temptations for belligerents to ignore a neutral State's closure of its
territorial sea to passage, and the greater burdens of surveillance and enforce
ment on neutrals will undoubtedly result in increased tensions in a broader
territorial sea.
Professor Michael Reisman and William K. Lietzau have recently written
that, "In addition to their important function in dissemination and transmission
of international legal information, [military operational] manuals are an impor
tant mode for making international law as well as evidencing its existence.,, 8o
In other words, the military manuals promulgated by States represent the
practice of such States. The fact that the manuals of three major maritime States
(United States, Canada, and Germany) have accepted the rules that were
applicable to a three-mile territorial sea as equally applicable to a twelve-mile
territorial sea strongly suggests that these principles are being incorporated into
customary international law despite rather strong arguments that could be made
that the factual and theoretical underpinnings for these rules have been under
mined by a quadrupling of the breadth of the territorial sea.
B. International Straits. Although, as developed above, a neutral coastal State

was permitted to close its territorial sea to all belligerent hostile activity,
including "mere passage by belligerent warships" under the pre- 1982 regime
of the territorial sea, it was also generally accepted that this right did not apply
to those parts of the territorial sea that comprised an international strait. 81 This
view was reinforced by the Corfu Channel case, 82 which affirmed the right of
British men-of-war to transit the strait between the Greek island of Corfu and
the Albanian mainland which was a secondary passage between the Ionian and
Adriatic Seas. In that case, the ICI stated:
It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance with
international custom that States in time of peace have a right to send their
warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts
of the high seas without previous authorization of a coastal State, provided
the passage is innocent. 83
This principle was codified in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention as
follows:
There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through
straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the
18

high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign
State. 84
As the number of adherents to territorial seas of twelve or more miles
expanded in the 1960s, a number of maritime States became concerned that the
regime of nonsuspendable innocent passage would provide insufficient protec
tion for undisputed transit rights through international straits. Not only did this
increased breadth of the territorial sea bring the waters of dozens of important
straits within the territorial seas of bordering States, some of these States gave
a more restrictive meaning to the "innocent" half of the innocent passage
definition than had been visualized by either the International Court of Justice
in the Corfu Channel case or the negotiators of the 1958 Territorial Sea
Convention. Some States based their determinations of innocence on such
85
factors as ownership of vessels, cargo carried, or destination of voyage. As a
result, a number of States, following the initiative of the United States and the
Soviet Union, began to discuss the possibility of a third U.N. conference on the
law of the sea for the purpose of establishing general agreement on a twelve
mile territorial sea coupled with freedom of navigation for ships and aircraft
through international straits. This movement coincided in time with Ambas
sador Pardo 's initiative in the U.N. General Assembly for internationalization
of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The confluence of these
two movements eventually resulted in the convening of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), one of whose
outcomes was the adoption of the doctrine of "transit passage" for ships and
aircraft through straits used for international navigation between the high seas
or an EEZ and another part of the high seas or EEZ.
The provisions of the LOS Convention concerning transit passage are
contained in Part III of the Convention, "Straits Used for International Naviga
tion." As previously stated, transit passage applies to all straits used for
international navigation between the high seas or an EEZ and another part of
86
the high seas or EEZ, with three exceptions, as follows:
1 . Straits in which passage is regulated in whole or in part by long-standing
87
international conventions in force specifically relating to such straits;
2. Straits through which there exists a high seas or EEZ route "of similar
88
convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics;
and
3. Straits formed by an island and mainland of the same State if there exists
a high seas or EEZ route "of similar convenience with respect to the navigational
89
and hydrographical characteristics" seaward of the island.
For the first category, the governing regime is that which is provided in the
"long-standing international convention" regulating passage through it. For the
second, it is ordinary (i. e. , suspendable) innocent passage as codified in the
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90
territorial-sea Part of the Convention. For the third, the regime is nonsus
91
pedable innocent passage.
By the terms of Part III of the LOS Convention, transit passage is more akin
to the freedom of navigation exercised by ships and aircraft on the high seas
than it is to innocent passage as codified in Part II of the Convention. Transit
passage is defined as the exercise of the "freedom of navigation and over
92
flight,, by ships and aircraft in their "normal modes of continuous and
93
expeditious transit. ,, During transit passage ships and aircraft must proceed
through the strait without delay, refrain from the threat or use of force against
bordering States and other acts contrary to the U.N. Charter, and comply with
other relevant provisions of Part III. In addition ships must comply with
,
generally accepted rules for safety at sea and for the prevention, reduction, and
control of pollution from ships, and aircraft must observe the leAO rules for air
94
navigation and monitor the appropriate radio frequencies. Although ships and
aircraft in transit passage must comply with the laws and regulations of the
States bordering straits, the content of such rules is confined to the safety of
navigation, the prevention of fishing by fishing vessels, the prevention of
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary offenses, and regulations which give
effect to applicable international regulations for the control of pollution by oil
9
and other noxious substances. 5 States bordering straits may not impede transit
passage nor adopt laws or regulations "that discriminate in form or in fact
among foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect of denying,
96
hampering or impairing the right of transit passage . . . . ,, Even if the transiting
ship or aircraft violates the laws or regulations of the States bordering a strait,
these States may not deny or terminate the transit-passage rights of the ship or
aircraft but must find their remedy in a civil suit if the offender is a merchant
ship or civil aircraft or under the principles of State responsibility if it is a ship
97
or aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity.
If under the pre-existing regime for straits it was generally accepted that
neutral States could not deny passage to belligerent ships, including warships,
in time of war, then ajortiori it should follow that this rule should be preserved
under the more liberal transit-passage regime. But this new regime has two
elements not included in the older one of nonsuspendable innocent passage: ( 1)
it applies to aircraft; and (2) ships and aircraft may transit in their "normal
mode. " The second of these has been interpreted as including the submarines '
98
right to submerged transit. Does it necessarily follow that submerged passage
by submarines and overflight by belligerent aircraft should be allowed under
the doctrine of transit passage in time of war? Adopting a teleological approach,
Dr. Rauch answers yes. He states :
One of the advantages of the new transit passage concept is that it keeps the
littoral States bordering straits with great strategic value out of the vicious
20

circle of escalation in times of tension and crisis. If transit through such straits
were subject to the discretion of the coastal States, they would unavoidably
become invol ved, even if the discretionary power were to be exercised
evenhandedly . . . . The ramifications of a refusal or of a permission of transit
in whole or in part . . . could, albeit legally non-discriminatory, in fact be of
quite different military and strategic value to the parties to the conflict. . . .
The escalation-preventing qual ity of transit passage in times of tension and
crisis-i. e. , in time of fragile peace-are even more important for neutral
99
States in times of armed conflict.
The United States naval manual asserts that the transit passage provisions of
the LOS Convention are a part of customary international law and interprets
them as providing very broad rights for passage of belligerent forces in time of
war for straits bounded by neutral S tates, stating:
Customary international law as reflected in the 1 982 Law of the Sea Conven
tion provides that belligerent and neutral surface ships, submarines and
aircraft have a right of transit passage through, over, and under all straits used
for international navigation. Neutral nations cannot suspend, hamper, or
otherwise impede this right of transit passage through international straits.
Belligerent forces transiting through international straits overlapped by
neutral waters must proceed without delay, must refrain from the threat or
use of force against the neutral nation, and must otherwise refrain from acts
of hostility and other activities not incident to their transit. Belligerent forces
in transit may, however, take defensive measure consistent with their
security, including the launching and recovery of aircraft, screen formation
steaming, and acoustic and electronic surveillance. Belligerent forces may
not use neutral straits as a place of sanctuary nor a base of operations, and
bell igerent warships may not exercise the belligerent right of visit and search
100
in those waters.
The C anadian draft manual has a similar, though less extensive provision,
as follows:
Warships and military aircraft of a belligerent state may exercise the right of
transit passage, that is, of essentially unimpeded passage or overflight in an
appropriate state of readiness with appropriate sensors activated, through
. . . . 101
certain straits where the transit passage [regime?] applies
The German draft manual does not address the issue of passage through
neutral straits separately from the question of passa ge through the territoria l sea
generally. It is to be recalled that the German manual appears to be ambiguous
as to whether the right of innocent passa ge for belligerent warships through the
territorial sea of a neutral State may be suspended.

1 02

Based on the foregoing, both logic and state practice l ead to the conclusion
that the peacetime regime of transit passage, as formulated in Part III of the

21

The Newport Papers

LOS Convention, is equally applicable in time of anned conflict to the passage
of belligerent warships (including submerged submarines) and aircraft through
straits bounded by neutral States.
One further aspect of the straits question deserves at least brief mention
before leaving this subject; that is, the issue of straits governed by treaty
regimes. As will be recalled, Article 35 of the LOS Convention excepted from
the transit-passage regime, "straits in which passage is regulated in whole or
in part by long-standing international conventions in force specifically relating
to such straits. ,, 1 03 During the course of the negotiations in UNCLOS m, various
delegates suggested that this exception would apply to the Straits of the
Dardanelles and Bosporus (Turkey), I04 the Strait of Magellan (Argentina and
I06 and the Aaland Strait
Chile,) IOS the Belts and Sound (Sweden-Denmark,)
7
1
(Sweden-Finland) . 0
A detailed examination of each of these Conventions is beyond the scope of
this paper. Dr. Rauch, however, raises the question in his monograph as to
whether all of these straits are actually "regulated" by the Conventions referred
to in the footnotes so as to qualify for exemption from the transit-passage
regime. Although acknowledging that at least two leading international
authorities in the field disagree with him as to the Danish Straits and the Strait
of Magellan, he concludes, based on the analysis therein as well as his prior
works to which he refers, that except for the Turkish Straits, "would-be
claimants to Art. 35(c) status simply fail to make a credible case.,, 1 08 The United
States' manual, though not explicitly excluding other treaty-regime straits,
mentions only the Turkish Straits as being entitled to this exception to the
.
' passage. 109
regime 0f transit
In the case of the Turkish Straits, in time of war, Turkey being a neutral, the
Montreux Convention provides for freedom of transit for neutral warships but
prohibits passage of belligerent warships except under certain exceptional
circumstances delineated in the Convention. If Turkey is at war, Turkey has
complete discretion as to the transit of warships. 1 1 0

C. The Contiguous Zone. As discussed above, l l l the contiguous zone is

an

area of limited jurisdiction. The competence of the coastal State in this zone is
limited to the exercise of the control necessary to prevent infringement of the
coastal State's customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary regulations within its
territory or territorial sea. J l2 The International Law Commission explicitly
refused to recognize special security rights for the contiguous zone, and the
1958 and 1982 Conventions adopted the ILC's fonnula. 1 1 3 The contiguous zone
is, for all intents and purposes, the equivalent of the high seas insofar as the
conduct of hostile operations by belligerents and the exercise of belligerent or
neutral rights and obligations are concerned. Thus, the extension of the outer
limit of the contiguous zone from its fonner distance of twelve miles from the
22

baseline to twenty-four nautical miles as provided by article 33 of the 1982 LOS
Convention should not be of any significance in the application of the law of
anned conflict at sea.
The contiguous zone is, of course, overlapped by the exclusive economic
zone and the continental shelf. Insofar as the rules of anned conflict may be
affected by the creation of these latter juridical areas in the oceans, which will
be discussed below, those same effects would be felt in the contiguous zone.
D. The Exclusive Economic Zone. The adoption of the concept of an exclusive

economic zone (EEZ) in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention represents the
culmination of a long-continued effort by some segments of the international
community to separate "jurisdiction" over the natural resources of offshore
waters from "sovereignty" manifest in the territorial sea. As stated earlier, 1 14
by virtue of the territorial sea owing its origin to the law of neutrality, its
"application to the right of fishing is accidental." In the words of Dr. Rauch,
" [The EEZ] is the synthesis of the fisheries zone, epicontinental sea, patrimonial
sea, and the continental shelf concept which started with the Truman Proclama
tion of 1945. ,, 1 15
Although the coastal State exercises "sovereign rights" over the EEZ for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting, managing and conserving its living and
non-living resources and "jurisdiction" to the extent provided in the Convention
with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and
structures, marine scientific research, and the protection and preservation of the
marine environment, 1 16 it is clear that the EEZ is not incorporated into the
territorial regime of the coastal State as are internal waters and the territorial
sea. 1 17 Reinforcing the distinction between the territorial sea and the exclusive
economic zone is paragraph 2 of Article 58, which states, "Articles 88 to 1 1 5
[from the High Seas Part of the Convention] and other pertinent rules of
international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not
incompatible with this Part." Article 89, which is among those articles so
incorporated into the exclusive-economic-zone Part of the Convention, states,
"No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty ...
Whether one considers the EEZ as part of the high seas, as some authorities
contend, or as an area that is sui generis, as contended by others, 1 18 it is clear
that it is a zone that is neither territorial nor has wholly the characteristics of
high seas. It is a zone in which competences are allocated to coastal States on
the one hand and all other States on the other so as to balance the need of the
coastal State to have sufficient authority to exploit and manage the economic
resources (article 56 ( 1 )) against the need of all other States to retain high seas
navigation and communications freedoms and uses related to such freedoms
(article 58 ( 1 )) . Article 58( 1) describes these high-seas freedoms as follows:
23
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1 . In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-lock
ed, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms
referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the
sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of
ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the
other provisions of this Convention.
As stated by Elliot Richardson, the United States Ambassador to UNCLOS

Ill :
In the group which negotiated this language it was understood that the
freedoms in question . . . must be qua litative ly and quantitatively the same as
the traditional high-seas freedoms recognized by international law: they must
be qualitatively the same in the sense that the nature and extent of the right
is the same as the traditional high-seas freedoms; they must be quantitatively
the same in the sense that the included uses of the sea must embrace a range
no less complete-and allow for future uses no less inclusive-than tradi
tional high-seas freedoms, l l9
Except for the freedom of fishing, freedom of sci entific research, and
freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations which are related
to the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the EEZ, the freedoms

87 as applicable in the high seas.
58 is not open-ended, as is article 87 in which the enumeration

are identical to those enumerated in article
Although article

of high seas freedoms is preceded by the term

inter alia,

the addition of the

phrase "and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these
freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and
submarine cables and pipelines" in article
pose.

120

58

seems to serve the same pur

The balance between the rights of coastal S tates and other States in the

EEZ is also reflected in the paragraphs of articles 56 and

58 which require both
coastal States (article 56(2» and other States (article 58(3» to have "due regard"
to the rights and duties of "other" States and coastal States respectively.
In assessing this balance and applying it to the operations of warships in the
exclusive economic zone, Professor Oxman concluded as follows:
[W]arships in principle enjoy freedom to carry out their military missions

under the regime of the high seas subject to three basic obligations: ( 1 ) the
duty to refrain from the unlawful threat or use of force; (2) the duty to have
"due regard" to the rights of others to use the sea; and (3) the duty to observe
applicable obligations under other treaties or rules of international law. The
same requirements apply in the exclusive economic zone, with the addition
of an obligation to have "due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal
State" in the exclusive economic zone.121
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Although Oxman was concerned explicitly only with peacetime rights, his
conclusion is equally applicable in time of anned conflict as well. The juridical

nature of the zone does not change with the transition from peace to war 1 22
.

There is thus no basis for concluding that, except for the duty to have due regard
to the rights of the coastal State for the exploitation of the economic resources
of the zone, the conduct of hostilities by belligerent States in the exclusive
economic zone of a neutral State is subject to greater restraints than is the ir
conduct on the high seas. Clearly, there is no basis for concluding from the
tenns of the LOS Convention that the EEZ is to be equated to the territorial sea
insofar as the application of the rules of neutrality are concerned.
Nevertheless, there have been suggestions from States and in the literature
that some States may regard the regime of the EEZ as encompassing the right
of coastal States to control military operations in the EEZ. The earliest sugges
tion to this effect which

I have discovered

was published anonymously in the

official journal of the Swedish Navy in 1 974, and is quoted in English transla
tion in Dr. Rauch 's monograph as follows:
For Sweden it is of great interest to prevent, that other States use our exclusive
economic zone for the deployment of nuclear weapons. The coastal State has
to make sure that this does not happen . . . . In times of war the neutral State
has the obligation under the 1907 Convention to protect its merchant navy
and those of other States against military operations. The neutral State is also
obliged to prevent the use of its sea territory by a bel ligerent as a base for
naval operations against the adverse party. The rights and duties layed upon
the coastal States in the exclusive economic zone will also have to be fulfilled
in situations where the coastal State remains neutral in a war between third
powers. The protection of neutrality in this case is evidently- in whole or in

part-extended to the exclusive zone.12l

At several times during the negotiation of the Law of the Sea Convention, the
delegate of Sweden made statements concerning the relevance of the Conven
tion to the law of neutrality as expressed in Hague

XIII. 1 24

Although the

connection between the anonymous article and the official statements of the
Government of Sweden is not readily apparent, Dr. Rauch raises them as a
matter of concern.
Dr. Rauch analyzes several bases on which a claim might be made that the
neutrality rules of Hague

XIII

applicable to the territorial sea were also

applicable to the EEZ. One is the similarity of language in Hague

XIII and the

LOS Convention. While acknowledging that the French text of the LOS
Convention uses the tenns

droit souverain

and

juridiction

to describe the

jurisdiction exercised by the coastal State in the EEZ, which are also the tenns
used in the French text of Hague

XIII

(the only authentic text) , he does not

conclude from this that "the new concept of the exclusive economic zone is

nunc pro tunc to

be included in the historical scope of application" of Hague
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xm. In his view, it is clear that what was meant by the terms droit souverain
andjuridiction in Hague XIII was maritime areas subject to the sovereignty of
the State-in modern terms, the territorial sea and internal waters.

125

But Rauch

does not stop at that point; he argues that if a State may not subject the EEZ to
its sovereignty in time of peace, citing article

89,

it "amounts to a clear

prohibition in time of war to attempt to subject the exclusive economic zone to
12
principles of neutrality," 6 since " [t]he starting point of the regulations ought
127
to be the sovereignty of the neutral State. ,,
He concludes that "acts of hostility
between belligerents can be committed in the exclusive economic zones of
neutral States as a legitimate exercise of traditional rights under the law of
128

war.,,

While Dr. Rauch's conclusion would appear to be irrefutable, at least one
other thread tying the EEZ to territorialist theories has appeared. At the fmal
session of the Conference in Montego Bay, Jamaica, in

1 982, Brazil

declared

on its signing of the Convention that its government "understands that the
provisions of the Convention do not authorize other States to carry out military
exercises or manoeuvres within the exclusive economic zone, particularly when
these activities involve the use of weapons or explosives, without the prior
129
knowledge and consent of the coastal State. ,,
Similar statements have also
l3l
l30
been made by the governments of Cape Verde
and Uruguay.
These
statements were contested by statements of the governments of Italy, France,
1 32
and have been rejected
and the United States, exercising the right of reply,
by Ambassador T.T.B. Koh, who was the President of UNCLOS ill during the
133
latter part of the Conference,
as well as by Barbara Kwiatkowska in her
I 34
treatise on the EEZ.

In addition to i ts assertions concerning military maneuvers i n the EEZ, Brazil
also requested the Legal Committee of ICAO to hold that the rules of overflight
of the EEZ were the same as for those over land territory and the territorial sea.
The Legal Committee rejected this request, holding that such a position was
totally incompatible with the provisions of the LOS Convention, which equate
135

the EEZ with the high seas insofar as freedom of overflight is concerned.

Although the positions stated by Brazil, Cape Verde, and Uruguay were
directed explicitly to a peacetime situation, one may infer that they might be
asserted with respect to the conduct of hostilities and other military operations
in their exclusive economic zones in time of war. As already developed, this
position cannot be supported by the terms of the LOS Convention. Nor is it
supported by the three military manuals that have been examined. The Canadian
Draft Military Manual provides explicitly in paragraph

703 that, "The general

area within which the naval forces of belligerents are permitted to conduct
operations involving the use of force includes: the high seas (including ex
13
clusive economic zones) . . . . ,, 6 The German Manual likewise provides, " [A]s
a matter of principle acts of naval warfare may be performed as in the high seas
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also in the exclusive economic zones of neutral or non-belligerent states ...

137

Although the United States 's manual does not state the same proposition
explicitly, it does so by negative implication by defining neutral territory as
including only the neutral ' s land, internal waters, territorial sea, and ar
1 8
chipelagic waters (if any) . 3
From the foregoing analysis, it seems incontestable that, despite the asser
tions of a few States and publicists, the exclusive economic zone may be equated
to the high seas insofar as the application of the law of neutrality is concerned.
Since the rights of the coastal State in the seabed of the EEZ are exercised in
139
discus
accordance with the continental-shelf Part of the LOS Convention,
sion of hostile military activities or placing of military devices on the seabed
of the EEZ will be discussed below in the section on the continental shelf.

E.

The Continental Shelf.

The continental shelf comprises the seabed and

subsoil of a coastal State from the outer boundary of its territorial sea to the
outer edge of the continental margin or, for coastal States with margins less
140
For

than 200 miles, to the outer boundary of the exclusive economic zone.

the few coastal States which have continental margins wider than 200 miles,
the edge of the continental margin is determined by a complex formula
contained in article 76 of the Convention which may extend the outer boundary
to as much as 350 miles from the baseline or 100 miles beyond the 25OO-meter
isobath.
On the continental shelf the coastal State exercises "sovereign rights for the
141
Unlike the EEZ,

purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. ,,

however, the coastal State 's jurisdiction over the continental shelf does not
extend to the water column or airspace above it, except insofar as is necessary
to allow the coastal State to construct artificial structures on the continental
shelf for the purpose of exploiting it and establishing reasonable safety zones
around such structures. In this connection, the provisions of Article 60 of the
EEZ Part of the Convention apply mutatis mutandis to the continental shelf. 142
The Convention provides explicitly that "the rights of the coastal State over the
continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters or of
the air space above those waters" and that " [t]he exercise of the rights of the
coastal State over the continental shelf must not infringe or result in any
unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other
14
States as provided for in this Convention ... 3 Conversely, by incorporation of
article 60 by reference into the continental-shelf Part of the Convention , "All
ships must respect these safety zones [around continental-shelf installations]
and shall comply with generally accepted international standards regarding
na vigation in the vicinity of artificial islands, installations, structures and safety
I44
zones."
Thus, the waters above the continental shelf are governed by the
27
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regime of the exclusive economic zone insofar as they are within 200 miles of
the baseline and by the regime of the high seas where they are beyond that limit.
Since the continental shelf itself has a status different from the waters
superjacent to it, it is appropriate to discuss acts of warfare that may be
conducted in the water column separately from those that may be conducted on
the seabed itself.
1. Waters Superj acent to the Continental Shelf. As the previous discus
sion of the exclusive economic zone has concluded, the waters of the EEZ have
the same characteristics as those of the high seas with respect to the conduct of
hostilities by belligerents therein and the application of the law of neutrality
thereto, save only for the duty to have "due regard" for the rights of the coastal
State in the zone. A fortiori the waters above the continental shelf beyond the
exclusive economic zone are high seas in the strictest sense of that term and are
not in any way different from other parts of the high seas with respect to
belligerent activity save only the duty to respect the safety zones and comply
with international standards regarding navigation in the vicinity of artificial
45
islands, installations, structures, and safety zones. 1 Thus, the only restriction
on the law of armed conflict at sea that would be made necessary by the
emergence of the continental shelf as a defined area of the oceans is to
incorporate cautionary notes concerning respect for and non-interference with
legitimate activities and structures utilized by the coastal State for exploitation
of the natural resources of the shelf.
2. The Seabed of the Continental Shelf. Since the relevant articles of both
147
146
the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention
and the LOS Convention
recog
nize that the coastal State exercises only "sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploiting" the shelf and its resources, they visualize that other States may use
the seabed of the shelf for other purposes not inconsistent with and not
interfering with the coastal State's exclusive rights of exploitation of natural
resources. Although India introduced a proposal at UNCLOS I that would have
prohibited the building of military bases or installations on the continental shelf
148
"by the coastal State or any other State," this proposal was defeated.
A similar
proposal, but limiting the prohibition to States other than the coastal State, was
put forth by Mexico and Kenya at an early stage of UNCLOS III. This proposal
149
did not find its way into the negotiating texts nor the final Convention.
The
negotiating history of the two most important international instruments would
thus seem to suggest that, subject to the restrictions on the use of the seabed
found in the Conventions themselves, emplacing weapons or other military
devices on the seabed of the continental shelf, both within the 200-mile EEZ
50
and beyond, is permissible as the exercise of a freedom of the high seas. 1 The
military activities on the seabed of the continental shelf most often discussed
are the laying of mines or cable arrays for underwater detection and surveil
lance.
28

Article 60 of the LOS Convention, which is applicable to the continental
shelf as well as to the

EEZ, contains the relevant restrictions on the construction

of installations on the seabed. It provides in part as follows :
Article 60
Artificial islands, install ations and structures in the
exclusive economic zone

1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the ex
. clusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction,
operation and use of:
(a) artificial islands;
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided in article 56
and other economic purposes;
(c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of
the rights of the coastal State in the zone.
2. The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial
islands, installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to
customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and regulations.
3. Due notice must be given of the construction of such artificial islands,
installations or structures . . .
4. The coastal State may, where necessary, establish reasonable safety
zones around such artificial islands, installations and structures . . .

6.
7.

All ships must respect these safety zones . . .
Artificial islands, installations and structures and the safety zones
around them may not be established where interference may be caused to the
use of recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation.
(Emphasis supplied)
A careful reading of the quoted portion of Article

60

reveals that a coastal

State may regulate (under a reasonable interpretation this would also include
"prohibit") the construction, operation, and use of artificial islands whatever
their purposes, other installations and structures whose purposes are the
economic exploration or exploitation of the

EEZ or continental shelf,

and those

installations erected by others which may interfere with the rights of the coastal
State in the zone. In other words, a coastal State has the exclusive right to

EEZ and on the continental shelf.
not have the right to regulate or prohibit installations and structures
other than artificial islands unless they are for an economic purpose or would

construct and regulate artificial islands in the
But it does

interfere with the coastal State 's right to economic exploitation of the zone or
shelf. In addition, neither the coastal State nor any other State may construct or
operate structures or installations where they wil l interfere with navigation
(para.

6),

and other States must respect the safety zones establ ished by the

coastal State. Furthermore, the constructing State need not give notice of such
installations or structures unless they are of such a type that their location or
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operation "may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal State"
(para. 3). Of course, the State other than the coastal State engaging in such
activities must abide by the requirements of "due regard" for the rights of the
coastal State and for the interests of all States in their exercise of the freedoms
of the high seas.
Under the foregoing interpretation, which is believed to be the correct one,
there is no prohibition against States other than the coastal State employing or
emplacing weapons or detection devices on the seabed of the EEZ or continental
shelf if they would not interfere with the coastal State's exploitation of the
resources of the EEZ or continental shelf and if they are in compliance with the
explicit restrictions contained in article 60. 15 1
152 the Seabed Treaty of
Although the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963,
197 1 , 153 and the Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967 154 contain certain restrictions on the
emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in
some areas of the seabed, I have not included a discussion of their provisions,
since the subjects of those treaties are beyond the scope of this paper.

Archipelagic Waters. Under the traditional law of the sea, and under most
circumstances in the 1982 LOS Convention, islands are treated in the same
manner as mainlands with respect to the drawing of baselines and delimitation
of the territorial sea and other coastal zones. The 1982 Convention, however,
recognized a special exception in the case of archipelagic States, which are
permitted to draw archipelagic baselines enclosing a newly recognized category
of waters-archipelagic waters.
Archipelagic waters are created when an archipelagic State meeting the
qualifications of article 47 of the LOS Convention draws archipelagic baselines
joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago. The waters enclosed thereby are denominated "archipelagic
waters."
The terms of article 47 permit archipelagic baselines to be as much as 100
nautical miles long, with u p t o three percent o f th e total number o f baselines as
much as 1 25 miles in length. As can be seen by examining a map of Indonesia,
which is the archetypical archipelagic State, adoption of archipelagic baselines
can create archipelagic waters of enormous proportions. Indonesia stretches
approximately 3,000 miles east to west and almost 1 ,000 miles north to south.
Indonesia's archipelagic baselines are over 8,000 miles in length and enclose
some 666,000 square nautical miles of ocean space. They also encompass the
important straits of Sunda, Sumba, Lombok, Ombai, Molucca, and Macassar
155
as well as a number of important internal passages within the archipelago.
The sovereignty of the archipelagic State extends to all waters enclosed by
archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast
(article 49) . The sovereignty also extends to the airspace above and the bed and
F.
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subsoil of the archipelagic waters. Essentially, the only limitations on the
sovereignty of the archipelagic State over archipelagic waters are the rights
preserved in all other States

( 1 ) to archipelagic sea-lanes passage and air routes

through archipelagic sea-lanes as defIned by the archipelagic State, or if none
are designated then through the routes normally used for international naviga
tion (article 53), and
waters (article

52).

(2) to innocent passage through other areas of archipelagic

Within archipelagic waters, archipelagic States may draw

closing lines for the delimitation of internal waters in accordance with the rules
for drawing baselines for the territorial sea (article

50). The archipelagic State's

territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf
extend outward from the archipelagic baselines.

1. Archipelagic Waters Outside of Archipelagic Sea-Lanes. The legal

character of archipelagic waters is essentially identical to that of the territorial
sea. On this basis Dr. Rauch concludes without serious discussion that "bel
ligerents in future will have to respect archipelagic waters the same way as they
I S6
have to respect the territorial sea of the coastal State."
The United States
manual adopts the same conclusion, although it precedes it with a cautionary
statement, as follows:
The balance of neutral and belligerent rights and duties with respect to
neutral waters is, however, at its most unsettled in the context of archipelagic
waters.
Belligerent forces must refrain from acts of hostility in neutral archipelagic
waters and from using them as a sanctuary or a base of operations. m
In its chapter on the rights and duties of neutral powers, the Canadian draft
manual likewise equates archipelagic waters of a neutral State to the territorial
sea of such a State, stating:
1 . Neutral waters are the inland waters, internal waters, territorial seas
and, where applicable, archipelagic seas of states which are not participants
in an international armed conflict. . . .
2. Any act of hostility, as, for example, the seizure of or attack upon an
enemy vessel within neutral waters is a breach of neutrality and as such is
I �8
forbidden.

In the chapter on conduct of hostilities at sea, however, in the paragraph entitled
"General Area of Naval Warfare," the Draft Manual does not include ar
chipelagic waters of belligerents in the recitation of areas of the sea open to the
conduct of hostilities. That paragraph provides:
1 . The general area within which the naval forces of belligerents are
permitted to conduct operations involving the use of force includes: the high
seas (including exclusive economic zones), the territorial sea and internal
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waters of belligerents, the territory of belligerents accessible to naval forces,
and the air space over such waters and territories. 1 59
These apparent inconsistencies undoubtedly reflect the fact that the Canadian
160
Manual is still in draft fonn and will be addressed in the review process.
Although the Gennan Manual states that archipelagic waters of the parties
to the conflict are legitimate areas for the perfonnance of acts of naval
161
warfare,
its chapter l I on the law of neutrality refers only to the "territorial
162
In paragraph 10 12 of the preceding chapter on anned
waters" of neutrals.
conflict at sea, however, the Manual states that "The rights of coastal and
archipelagic states must . . . be taken into due consideration." The Gennan
Manual, like the Canadian one, is also in draft fonn and subject to further
revision.
What has been said above with respect to the effects of the broadening of the
territorial sea as a result of the adoption of a twelve-mile breadth and the
163
liberalization and abuse of straight baselines
applies with even more vigor
to archipelagic waters. If, in a situation in which an archipelagic State such as
Indonesia is a neutral, these vast areas of archipelagic waters which were
fonnerly high seas are to be removed from the area open to the conduct of naval
hostilities and to become "neutral waters" with all the consequences that that
tenn implies, both for the rights and obligations of neutral States as well as to
the belligerent States, one may wonder whether either neutrals or belligerents
will be able to live up to their obligations. If the narrow Norwegian territorial
sea was a "covered way" enabling Gennan submarines to transit to and from
l 64
the high seas sheltered from attack by British naval and a ir forces,
neutral
archipelagic waters could become a vast, protected superhighway providing a
tempting haven for escape from attack and as a secret base for operations. The
vastness of such waters certainly renders dubious the so-called twenty-four
165
hour rule of Hague xm
and increases manifold the burdens imposed on a
l 66
neutral State by the obligation to exercise surveillance of its neutral waters.
This i s true whether the archipelagic State chooses to allow belligerent warships
to continue to exercise the right of "mere passage" through its archipelagic
waters or deny such passage, as would be pennitted if archipelagic waters are
167
analogized to the territorial sea in this respect.
In either event, the burdens
of surveillance and enforcement on the neutral State would be heavy, and the
neutra l ' s failure or i nability to live up to these obligations would be likely to
embroil it in the conflict. This danger is recognized in the United States manual ,
which provides :
The neutral archipelagic nation has an affinnative duty to police its ar
chipelagic waters to ensure that the inviolability of its neutral waters is
respected. If a neutral nation is unable or unwilling effectively to detect and
expel belligerent forces unlawfully present in its archipelagic waters, the
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opposing belligerent may undertake such self-help enforcement actions as
may be necessary to terminate the violation of neutrality. Such self-help
enforcement may include surface, subsurface, and air penetration of ar
chipelagic waters and airspace and the use of proportional force as neces
l68
sary .

2. Archipelagic Sea-Lanes and Archipelagic Sea-Lane Passage. The
waters of archipelagic sea-lanes and the airspace above them are subject to a
different navigation regime than are archipelagic waters outside such sea-lanes.

An archipelagic State may not deny to ships and aircraft of other States the right
of archipelagic sea-lane passage through its archipelagic waters in time of
1 69
peace .
In designating such passages, which will normally be fifty nautical
miles in width, the archipelagic State must include for ships "all normal
1 70
navigational channels."
If the archipelagic State fails to make such designa
tions, "the right of archipelagic sea-lanes passage may be exercised through the
171
As previously stated,

routes normally used for international navigation. ,,

archipelagic sea-lanes passage, in legal terms, is essentially identical to transit
172
passa ge through straits.
In exercising their rights of archipelagic sea-lanes
passa ge, foreign ships and aircraft may proceed in their "normal mode" but only
for the purpose of "continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between
one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the
173
high seas or an exclusive economic zone,',
and they must observe the same
types of rules and regulations that are applicable in transit passage through
174
straits.
S ince transit passage and archipelagic sea-lanes passage are to all intents and
purposes legally identical, the same logic which compelled the conclusion that
in time of war belligerent warships and military aircraft may exercise the right
of transit passage through neutral straits would lead to the same conclusion with
respect to archipelagic sea-lanes passage through archipelagic sea-lanes.
This conclusion is accepted by the United States manual, which states that:
Belligerent ships or aircraft, including submarines, surface warships, and
military aircraft retain the right of unimpeded archipelagic sea lanes passage
through, over, and under neutral archipelagic sea lanes. Belligerent forces
exercising the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may engage in those
activities that are incident to their normal mode of continuous and expeditious
passage and consistent with their security. m
The Canad ian Manual does not deal with archipelagic sea-lane passage
separately but rather couples it with transit passage, as follows :
Warships and military aircraft of a belligerent state may exercise the right of
transit passage, that is, of essentially unimpeded passage or overflight in an
appropriate state of readiness with appropriate sensors activated, through
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certain straits where the transit passage [regime?] applies or through
chipelagic sea lanes.176

ar

In interpreting what the United States manual means when it states "activities
that are incident to their normal mode," one needs to tum to the provisions of
the manual dealing with transit passag e through neutral straits, where it is stated:
Belligerent forces in transit may . . . take defensive measures consistent with
their security, including the launching and recovery of aircraft, screen forma
In
tion steaming, and acoustic and electronic surveillance.
Although archipelagic sea-lanes passage through archipelagic waters may
be the legal equivalent of transit passage through straits, geographical factors
may create large differences in practical effect. A strait is usually a geographical
phenomenon of small dimensions, usually only a few miles from entrance to
exit, requiring only a few hours, at most, for passa ge. 1 78 Usually there is only
one entrance and one exit. 1 79 On the other hand, taking Indonesia as the prime
example, archipelagic waters include vast areas, with numerous internal straits
and passages, dictating multiple, intersecting archipelagic sea-lanes. A naval
ship or formation entering at one extremity of the archipelago and steaming at
a wartime cruising speed of twenty knots, for example, would require over six
days to traverse its entire East-to-West dimension using the most direct route.
The ship or formation could, through the use of intersecting archipelagic
sea-lanes, emerge at any of a number of exits, shielded the entire time from air,
surface, or submarine attack from enemy forces. One may question whether it
is reasonable to assume that an enemy force would accept the traditional
restraints on hostile activities (which presumably would include surveillance)
for passa ge of such great span and duration.
3. Concludin g Remarks Concernin g Archipelag ic Waters. It is apparent
from the foregoing discussion that of the "new zones" recognized in the 1 982
LOS Convention, archipelagic waters present the most difficult issues. In a
paper prepared for delivery soon after the close of UNCLOS ill, Rear Admiral
Bruce Harlow, a vice-chairman of the United States delegation to that Con
ference, posed a number of questions concerning the impact archipelagic waters
would have on the law of neutrality. He stated:
What then is the solution? When a neutral cannot or will not take mean
ingful measures to preclude potential violations, may a belligerent step in and
undertake the mission of verifying that neutral waters are free of the enemy?
Or would this contravene the traditional rule of inviolability of neutral
sovereignty? If a departure from this rule were permitted for surveillance
missions, would such missions have to be identified so that they would not
be confused with prohibited belligerent operations? If the surveil
lance/verification mission detected a violator, would the matter have to be
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referred to the neutral for action, or could those engaged in surveillance attack
the violator pursuant to their belligerent right to take corrective measures
against known violations? What would happen if two opposing surveillance
forces met? May aircraft be used for surveillance/verification missions
despite the traditional prohibition on overflight of sovereign waters? What
standard would justify initiation of surveillance/verification missions: in the
discretion of the belligerent; upon a reasonable determination that the enemy
might use neutral waters; upon determination that the enemy was using
neutral waters? What would be the impact of a pattern of prior abuses without
evidence of a present violation? Would a different standard apply for a neutral
archipelagic state that was willing, but plainly unable, to take actions that
would effectively ensure that neutrality violations were precluded, than in the
case of another neutral whose words or deeds demonstrated a clear unwill
ingness, regardless of the level of its capabilities?180
Except for Dr. Rauch 's monograph, Admiral Harlow 's ruminations, and the
United States Manual, it would appear that the relationship between the status
of archipelagic waters and the law of armed conflict at sea (including the law
1 As
can
of neutrality), is largely unexamined in the published legal literature. 8 1
be seen from the foregoing discussion, archipelagic waters pose the most
difficult problems for a mechanical application of traditional rules of naval
warfare and neutrality to the zones created in the "new" law of the sea. It is
submitted that it is unlikely for the traditional rules to survive unchanged in the
event of a naval conflict in which archipelagic waters of significant dimensions
come into play, either as neutral waters or waters of either belligerent party.
G. The Area. According to the 1 982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
the "Area" is "the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits
182 In effect, this means that the seabed beyond the
of national jurisdiction.,,
outer edge of the continental shelf of any State comprises the Area. The legal

status of the waters superjacent to the Area and the airspace above those waters
is not affected by the creation of the Area. 183 In essence, the freedoms of the
high seas apply to these waters and airspace.
Part XI of the Convention, which governs activities in the Area, including
the regime for exploration and exploitation of its resources, is the most con
troversial Part of the Convention. Unlike those Parts of the Convention
heretofore discussed in this Report, Part XI has not been regarded as reflective
of customary international law. 1 84 The United States and several other States
of the developed world have assi gned as their reason for refusal to become
parties to the Convention the unacceptability of Part XI, and some have enacted
interim deep-sea mining codes that permit exploitation of the seabed beyond
national jurisdiction under national laws. 1 8S Nevertheless, even those States
which have refused to accept the detailed regime for mining the deep seabed
contained in Part XI accept the fact that whether the resources of the deep seabed
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are developed in accordance with Part XI or some successor regime or in
accordance with national laws, no State may claim or exercise sovereignty over
186
For that
the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
reason it is appropriate to include a paragraph or two about the implications of
the existence of such an area for the law of armed conflict at sea. For the sake
of convenience, it will be referred to as the " Area," even though that term is not
accepted by those States who object to Part XI of the Convention.
S ince the Area includes only the seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil thereof,
the only foreseeable impact it might have on hostile activities in the water
column and airspace above it is in the possible interference between the
platforms and other gear used by those who may be engaged in activities
exploiting the seabed (presumably neutrals) and belligerents engaging in hostile
activities against each other. With respect to such possible interferences, the
LOS Convention provides that the freedoms of the high seas "shall be exercised
by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas,

and also with due regard/or the rights under this
Convention with respect to activities in the Area.,, 1 87
The creation of the " Area," whatever form it may ultimately take, should

thus have no more impact on the conduct of armed hostilities on the high seas
than on other activities that take place on the open ocean, such as fishing and
scientific research.

VI
Mine Warfare
Although aU weapon systems and platforms are affected by the principles
and considerations which have been addressed above, naval mines are probably
the most acutely affected, since, except for rarely used unanchored mines, they
are usually laid in shallow waters, placing them within one of the zones subject
to coastal state jurisdiction. It is thus appropriate to include comments explicitly
directed to mine warfare in addition to the general discussion above in section

V.E. pertaining to the continental shelf.
Hague Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Contact Mines
is the only treaty law governing the emplacement and employment of naval
1 88
Hague VIII contains no geographical limitations on where mines may

mines .

be employed other than the rather vague geographical term "off the coast and

2 and "off their coasts" (referring to neutral
4. As pointed out by Professor Howard Levie in his recent
book, Mine Waifare at Sea, 1 89 articles originally proposed by the British
ports of the enemy" in Article

coasts) in article

delegation to the Hague Conference would have limited the laying of anchored
automatic submarine contact mines beyond three nautical miles from the
low-water mark along the whole extent of the coasts of belligerent states
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(friendly and enemy) with an extension allowed to ten nautical miles off
l90
Because of what Professor Levie describes as "strange
191
twists" in negotiation and parliamentary complications,
all references to

defended ports.

geographical limitations (other than the two mentioned above) were dropped
from the Convention. The negotiation thus focused on restrictions on minelay
ing generally applicable, regardless of area. The result was, as stated by Sir
Ernest Satow, the British delegate, that "the Convention as adopted imposes
upon the belligerent no restriction as to the placing of anchored mines, which
consequently may be laid wherever the belligerent chooses, in his own waters
for self-defense, in the waters of the enemy as a means of attack, or finally on
192
the high seas, . . . ..
A proposal by the Dutch delegation which would have prohibited the laying
193
Rather than

of mines so as to bar passage through straits met a similar fate.

include an article on straits, the final report of the Third Commission merely
included a statement that:
[T]he committee decided unanimously to suppress all provisions relating to
straits, which should be left out of the discussion in the present Conference.
It was clearly understood that under the stipulations of the Convention to be
concluded nothing whatever has been changed as regards the actual status of
straits. 194
After examining the practice of States in all conflicts since the adoption of
Hague VIII in

1907, Professor Levie concludes that:

[T]oday the practice of nations is that there is only one geographical limitation
on belligerent minelaying-they may not be laid in the territorial sea or inland
waters of neutrals. 1 9'
It should be remembered, however, that during most of the period covered by
Professor Levie's study, the breadth of the territorial sea was generally regarded
as extending only three nautical miles from baselines which were almost
uniformly drawn along the low-water mark of the coast line.

As developed in sections V.D . and E. above, the special economic and

resource jurisdiction exercised by States in their EEZ<; and continental shelves
does not prohibit the emplacement or employment of weapons (including
mines) on the seabed or in the waters of the EEZ and continental shelf unless
they would interfere with the coastal State's exploitation of the resources of the

EEZ or the continental shelf. On the other hand, coastal States exercise full
sovereignty over their internal waters, the territorial sea, and archipelagic
waters. The territorial sea is subject to the right of innocent passage, and where
it embraces a strait used for international navigation, also to the regime of transit
passage. Archipelagic waters are subject to the right of innocent passage, and
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in archipelagic sea-lanes (where none are designated, the routes nonnally used
for international navigation) , to the right of archipelagic sea-lane passage. In
principle, then, the same rules should apply to expanded territorial seas and to
archipelagic waters as applied to the territorial sea prior to its increase in breadth
to twelve nautical miles. Likewise, since archipelagic sea-lanes passage

is

substantially identical to transit passage through international straits, in prin
ciple, the rules for mining archipelagic sea-lanes should be the same as those

for international straits. As we saw in Section V., however, rules applicable to
a narrow territorial sea or a strait of limited geographical dimension may have
a substantially different effect when applied to areas having the same legal
characteristics but of vastly different geographical size. Nevertheless, the
military manuals and draft manuals that have been examined (U. S . , Canada,
Gennany) , appear to accept the same rules for the mining of expanded territorial
seas and archipelagic waters as previously have applied to internal waters and
the territorial sea. The United States Manual states:

9.2.2 Peacetime Mining. Consistent with the safety of its own citizenry, a
nation may emplace both armed and controlled mines1\l6 in its own internal
waters at any time with or without notification. A nation may also mine its
own archipelagic waters and territorial sea during peacetime when deemed
necessary for national security purposes. If armed mines are emplaced in
archipelagic waters or the territorial sea, appropriate international notification
of the existence and location of such mines is required. l97 Because the right
of innocent passage can be suspended only temporarily, armed mines must
be removed or rendered harmless as soon as the security threat that prompted
their emplacement has terminated. Emplacement of controlled mines in a
nation's own archipelagic waters or territorial sea is not subject to such
notification or removal requirements.
Naval mines may not be emplaced in the internal, territorial, or archipelagic
waters of another nation in peacetime without that nation' s consent. Control
led mines, however, may be emplaced in international waters beyond the
territorial sea subject only to the requirement that they do not unreasonably
interfere with other lawful uses of the oceans . . . .
9.2.3. Mining During Armed Conflict. Naval mines may be lawfully
employed by parties to an armed conflict subject to the following restrictions:

2.

Mines may not be emplaced by belligerents in neutral waters. 198

6. Naval mines may be employed to channelize neutral shipping, but
not in a manner to impede the transit passage of international
straits or archipelagic sea lanes passa ge of archipelagic waters by
such shipping.

8.

Mining of areas of indefinite extent in international waters is
prohibited. Reasonably limited barred areas may be established
by naval mines, provided neutral shipping retains an alternate
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route around or through such an area with reasonable assurance
of safety.
The Canadian Manual's paragraph on naval mines contains no reference to
geographic limitations, confming itself to quoting verbatim Articles

1

through

3 of Hague VII. l99 One must determine geographic limitations for mining by
2OO
turning to other provisions of the Manual dealing with areas of operations
2°1
The former of these permits the conduct of
and defining neutral waters.
operations using force (presumably including mines) on the high seas (includ
ing

EEZs) and the territorial sea and

internal waters of belligerents. The latter

forbids acts of hostility within neutral waters, which are defined as the inland
waters, internal waters, territorial seas, and archipelagic seas of States which
are not participants in the international armed conflict. It thus appears that while
the Canadian Manual would prohibit the laying of mines in neutral archipelagic
waters, it takes no position as to whether a belligerent may mine an opposing
belligerent's archipelagic waters. It is also silent as to whether any particular
restrictions apply with regard to mining international straits.
The German Manual deals with naval mines in both a peacetime and wartime
environment and in the context of protective, defensive and offensive mining,
which it defines as follows:

In laying mines the following kinds are distinguished:
protective mining, i.e., laying mines in friendly territorial and internal
waters.

defensive mining, i.e., laying mines in international waters for the
protection of passages, ports and their entrances.
offensive mining, i.e., laying mines in hostile territorial and internal
waters or in waters predominantly controlled by the adversary.202
The Manual contains no explicit provisions against mining of neutral waters,
but the paragraph on Scope of Application of the rules states that
[T]he space in which acts of naval warfare within the meaning of paragraph
1014 may be performed comprises:
the territory of the parties to the conflict accessible for naval forces.
the internal waters, the archipelagic waters and the territorial sea of the
parties to the conflict.
the high seas, and
the airspace over these land and sea areas?OJ
Peculiarly, paragraph

1014

does not include "mining" as one of the acts of

naval warfare, nor, for that matter, does it include attacking or sinking of enemy
warships. Presumably these ambiguities will

be clarified upon further revision

of the Draft Manual . Assuming, for the purpose of the discussion, however, that
the limitations in the "Scope of Application" paragraph are meant to apply to
mine warfare, it would appear that the German Draft Manual would equate the
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archipelagic waters of belligerent parties to the territorial sea and would
authorize their mining under the same rules that would apply to the territorial
sea.
The foregoing discuss i on suggests that neither the conventional law of mine
warfare nor the customary practice of States has provided very clear guidelines
as to the geographical limits of the employment of mines in naval conflict. The
only settled principles are that in the era of the three-mile territorial sea it was
lawful for a belligerent to employ mines in its own and its enemy 's territorial
sea and internal waters and that it was unlawful to employ them in the territorial
sea and internal waters of a neutral State. Although there have been attempts to
preserve freedom of navigation through international straits, and the United
States Manual states that it is unlawful to lay mines "in a manner to impede the
transit passage of international straits,

204

..

Professor Levie's study concludes

that passage through straits "has been barred by mines in past conflicts and
undoubtedly will be again in the future .

..205

Archipelagic waters present an even more difficult problem. As discussed

earlier, they are subject to the full sovereignty of the archipelagic State and in
their legal characteristics are substantially identical to the territorial sea. Tech
nically, then, the same principles that govern the mining of the territorial sea,
whether of a neutral or a belligerent, should govern the archipelagic waters, and
by the same rationale, the principles applicable to international straits should
apply to archi pe lagic sea-lanes. Either expressly or implied ly, the three service
manuals examined seem to accept these consequences. Whether this makes
sense and will fonn a basis for an effective regime in time of conflict seems
open to question. The vast areas encompassed with archipelagic waters and the
great lengths of some archi pelagic sea-lanes would suggest that rule-makers
should be careful not to create rules that will be honored more in their breach
than in their observance.

VII
Conclusions and Recommendations
The emergence of a "new" peacetime regime for the oceans, with its
expansion of existing zones subject to national jurisdiction and the creation of
new zones also subject to the same or similar fonns of jurisdiction, has created
problems of adaptation of the traditional rules of anned conflict at sea to these
new developments. As has been found in the foregoing analysis, the current
national manuals which have been examined (U. S . , Canadian and Gennan)
have adopted rules for the conduct of warfare in these new and expanded zones
that are identical to those that were applicable prior to their expansion (L e. , the
twelve-mile territorial sea) or have adopted by analogy the same rules for newly
created areas that were applicable to zones of much smaller dimension that in
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peacetime have the same legal characteristics (i. e. , archipelagic waters). As has
been suggested by the foregoing analysis, however, the geographic and opera
tional factors that determine the nature and scope of naval operations in time
of armed conflict, and, in particular, the relationships between belligerent and
neutral forces, render it uncertain as to whether such mechanical application of
prior rules to new or expanded areas of national jurisdiction serves the best
interests of either neutrals or belligerents or the humanitarian objectives of the
rules. Massive expansions of waters that are denied to belligerents for hostile
operations and for which neutral States have burdensome duties of surveillance
and control are likely to increase beyond belligerents' power to resist the
temptation to violate such waters and to overtax the capabilities of neutral States
to enforce their duties within them. The result may well be increased tension
between neutral and belligerent States with the consequent danger of widening
the area of conflict and drawing neutral States into it.
Admittedly, I have not been able to propose a better solution for the two areas
that create the most difficult problems-the expanded territorial sea (which may
be measured from greatly exaggerated baselines) and archipelagic waters.
Accordingly, in suggesting the tentative recommendations for formulating
updated rules applicable in various zones of the oceans as set forth below, I
have adopted the formulations of the three manuals. While this to some extent
ignores the problems I have pointed out with respect to these formulations, it
nevertheless accepts the three manuals as evidence of an emerging international
law in this area ?06 With this caveat in mind, I make the following tentative
recommendations for reformulation of the rules of naval warfare that are
affected by the emergence of new zones in the "new" law of the sea:
1 . Subject to other applicable rules of the law of armed conflict at sea,207
hostile operations by naval forces may be conducted on the high seas, the
territorial sea and internal waters, the land territories, and where applicable the
archipelagic waters, of the belligerent, any co-belligerent and the enemy. For
this purpose, the high seas include the exclusive economic zone and the waters
and airspace above the continental shelf.
2. When such hostile operations are conducted within the exclusive
economic zone or the waters or airspace above the continental shelf of a neutral
State, the belligerent States shall, in addition to observing the other applicable
rules of the law of armed conflict at sea, have due regard to the rights and duties
of the coastal State for the exploitation of the economic resources of the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. They shall, in particular,
respect artificial islands, installations, structures, and safety zones established
by neutral States in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf.
3. Neutral waters consist of the internal waters, territorial sea, and where
applicable the archipelagic waters, of a State which is not a party to the armed
conflict.
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4.

Within neutral waters hostile acts by belligerent forces are forbidden. A

neutral State must exercise such surveillance and enforcement measures as the
means at its disposal allow to prevent violation of its neutral waters by
belligerent forces.

5.

Hostile acts within the meaning of paragraph 4 include,

inter alia:

a. Attack or seizure of enemy warships or military aircraft;
b. Laying of mines;
c. Visit, search or capture;
d. Detention of a prize or establishment of a prize court;

6.

e. Use as a base of operations.

lOS

Subject to the duty of impartiality, and under such regulations as it may

establish, a neutral State may, without jeopardizing its neutrality, permit the
following acts within its neutral waters:
209
a. hmocent passage
through its territorial sea, and where applicable
its archipelagic waters, by warships and prizes of belligerent States; for the
purpose of exercising the right of innocent passa g e the warship or prize may
employ pilots of the neutral State;

b. Replenishment by a warship of its food, water and fuel sufficient to

reach a port within its national territory;
c. Repairs of warships found necessary by the neutral State to make
2 10
nor

them seaworthy; such repairs may not include repair of battle damage
increase their fighting strength.

7. A belligerent warship may not extend its stay in neutral waters for longer
than twenty-four hours unless the neutral State grants an extension because of:
a. The stress of weather, or
b. The route of innocent passage is of such length as to require more
than twenty-four hours for passage.

8. Belligerent warships and military aircraft may exercise the right of transit

passa ge through neutral international straits and archipelagic sea-lanes pass age
through neutral archipelagic waters. While within neutral waters comprising an
international strait or an archipelagic sea-lane, belligerent naval forces are
forbidden to carry out any hostile act.

9. Should a neutral State be unable or unwilling to enforce its neutral

obligations with respect to hostile military activities by belligerent naval forces

within its neutral waters, the opposing belligerent may use such force as is
necessary within such neutral waters to protect its own forces and to terminate
the violation of neutral waters.

10.

A neutral State shall not be considered to have jeopardized its neutral

status by exercising any of the foregoing neutral rights nor by allowing a
belligerent State to exercise any of the privileges permitted to a belligerent State.
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statement o f the U . S . and U.S.S.R. governments at the 1 989 Jackson Hole Summi t
Conference which included the statement that the two governme nts were guided b y the
provisions of the 1 982 Convention "which, w ith respect to traditional uses of the oceans,
generally constitute international law and practice and balance fairly the i n terests of all States . "
U . S . Department of Sta te , Department of State Bulletin, v. 8 9 ,
25-26 (December 1 989) .
6 1 . U . S . Department of the Navy, Office of the Chie of Naval Operations, Law of
Naval Waifare (NWIP 1 0-2) (Washi ngton: U.S. Government Pri nting Office, 1 955) , section
430a. (NWIP 1 0-2 is the predecessor manual to NW P-9 and is hereinafter cited as NW I P
1 0-2) . I state "as a general rule" because, under certain circumstan ces, when a neutral state
does not live up to its obligati on to prevent hostile acts within its maritime territory by one
belligerent, the opposing belligeren t who is harnled by such acts may take armed self-help
measures. O'Connell, supra note 2 8 , at p. 1 1 1 7 ; H . Lau terpacht, Oppenheim 's International
Law (London, New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co . , 7th ed, 1 95 2) , v. 2, p. 695
(hereinafter cited as Lauterpacht) ; U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP-9 (Rev. A))
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 989) , para . 7 . 3 . 4 . 2 (hereinafter cited as
NWP-9) .
62. Lauterpacht, supra note 6 1 , p . (,73; Whiteman, supra note 47, a t p . 1 78 and sources
cited therein. The principle is codified in article 9 o f Conventioll (X I I I) Concerning the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers i n Naval War, 1 8 O ctober 1 907, 36 Stat. 2 4 1 5 (U. S.) ,
1 DO British & Foreign State Papers ( 1 906-1 907) , pp. 448-454 (U. K . ) , reprinted at A merican
Journal of International Law, v. 2 (Supp . ) , p. 202 (cited hereinafter as Hague XIII) .
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63. Hague XIII, supra note 62.
64. Dietrich Schindler, "Commentary [on Hague Conventio n XIIIJ , " i n N. Ronzitti
(ed. ) , The LAw of Naval Waifare: A Collection of Agreements and Documents with Commentaries
(Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijho lT P ublishers, 1 988) , p. 21 1 , at pp. 2 1 5 , 22 1 .
65. Although Hague XIII does not include the words, "in i ts territorial waters," State
practice suggests that this was the meaning i ntended by the Article. See H. Lauterpacht, supra
note 6 1 , p. 746 and sources cited therein; Robert W. Tucker, U . S . Naval War College
I nternatio nal Law Studies, The LAw of War and Neutrality at Sea (Washi ngton: U . S .
Government Printing Office, 1 957) , p . 21 9, note 52 (cited hereinafter a s Tucker) .
66 . It is a disputed point as to whether this article applies only to stays in ports, roadsteads
or territorial waters or also to mere passage through the territorial sea which lasts more than
twenty-four hours. The Altmark incident, which will be discussed infra note 75, is illustrative
of how this issue might arise.
67. I t is a disputed oint as to whether a neutral State may allow a warship to repair
battle damage in a neu tra port. See H . A. Smith , The LAw and Custom of the Sea (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 2d ed. , 1 950) , p . 1 5 4 (cited hereinafter as Smith) ; Colombos, supra
note 1 5 , p o 654-657 . In any event, it is settled law that repairs which increase the fighting
strength 0 the damaged warship are not permitted. See Harvard Research in I nternational
Law, "Draft Co nvention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War,"
Comment o n Articles 32-36, A merican Joumal of Intemational LAw, V . 33 (Supp .) p . 1 69, at
p . 463 ( 1 939) .
68. LO S Convention, supra note 2, article 8, para. 3 .
6 9 . Elmar Rauch, Th e Protocol Additional t o the Geneva Conventiom for the Protection of
Victims of Intemational Armed Conflicts and the United Natiom Convention o n the LAw of the Sea :
Repercussiom on the LAw of Naval Waifare (Berlin: Du ncker & Humblot, 1 984) , p. 32 , citing
Hague XIII, NWIP 1 0-2, supra note 6 1 , and the Soviet Naval I nternatio nal Law Manual
(Moscow: 1 966) . B oth of these manuals, of course, were published prior to the codification
of the twelve-mile limit in the UN Law of the Sea Convention. (D r. Rauch 's monograph
is cited hereinafter as Rauch.)
70. NWP 9, supra note 6 1 , para. 7.3.4.2.
7 1 . Canadian Forces, LA w of A rmed Conflict Manual (Second Draft) (Ottawa: undated) ,
para. 1 509 (hereinafte r cited as Canadian Man uan . It should be noted that as an interim
measure until its draft manual is completed, the Canadia n Armed Forces have promulgated
MAOP-3 3 1 , Handbook on the LAw of Naval Operatiom, which , with a 1 6 -page Canadian
introduction , incorporates NWP 9 as Annex A.
72. German Federal Ministry of Defense , Humanitarian LAw in Armed Conflicts--Manual
(Bonn: 1 992, mimeo) , para. 1 1 1 9 (hereinafter cited as German Manuan .
73. Hague X I I I , supra note 62, article 3 (release a prize captured within neutral 's waters) ,
article 8 (prevent fitting out or arming of warships) , article 25 (exercise surveillance to prevent
violation of neutrality) .
74. See authorities cited in note 6 1 supra; see also Whiteman, supra note 47 , pp. 1 90 ff.
and sources cited therein.
75. For a detailed examination of the Altmark incident, see Brunson MacChesney, U. S.
Naval War College, Intemational LAw Situations and Documents, 1 956, Situation, Documents, and
Commentary on Recent Developments in the Intema tional LAw of the Sea (Washington : U.S.
G overnment Printing Office, 1 957) , V. 5 1 , pp . 3 If. (hereinafter cited as MacC hesney) . A
revised version is printed in MacCh esney, "The Altmark I ncident and Modern Warfare
' I nnocent Passage' in Wartime and the Righ t of Belligerents to Use Force to Redress
Neutrality Violations," Northwestem Univ. LAw Review, V. 52, p. 320 Quly-August 1 957) . See
also, C . H . M . Waldock, "The Release of the Altmark Prisoners, " British Yearbook of
Intemational LAw, V . 24, p. 2 1 6 (1 947) .
76. See Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1 948) , pp. 53 1 -532; see also H. A. Smith, supra note 67 at p . 153.
77. Some States continue to assert that innocent passage of warships is subject to advance
notifi c ation or consent. During UNCLOS I l l , a number of States introduced amendments
to the draft C onvention seeking to make this an explicit requirement. Of. ponents pointed
out that adoption of such a requirement would be a "conference-breaker. ' The matter was
finally resolved whe n the President of the Conference persuaded the propo nents of the
amendments to withdraw them in conjunction with his entering into the records of the
Conference a statement that " their decision is with out prejudice to the rights of coastal States
to adopt measures to safeguard their security interests, in accordance with articles 1 9 and 25

f

r

46

of the draft Convention. " United Nations, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea: Official Records (New York : United Nations, 1 984) , v. XVI , p. 132, para. 1 (cited
hereinafter as UNCLOS O R) . A number of States made statements at their signi ng or
ratification of the Convention that the tenns of the Convention are without prej udice to
their right to adopt measures regulating the passage of warships through their territorial seas.
These States included Cape Verde, Democ ratic Yemen , Egypt, Finland, Iran, O man,
Romania, Sao Tome and Pri ncipe, Sudan, Sweden, and Yemen. See Multilateral Treaties
Deposited with the Secretary- General, ch. XXI . 6 (ST /LE G /SER.E/8, pp. 780-794) . Several
States made statements asserting that warships were entitled to exe rcise the right of innocent
passage without noti tying o r obtaining the authorization of the coastal State . See statements
in the exercise of the right of reply by France, Italy, United Kingdom, and the United S tates,
UNCLOS I I I OR, supra, v. XVI I , pp. 241 -244.
78 . Hague XIII, supra note 58, Article 10. MacChesney's examinati on of the meaning
of "mere passage" provides the following i nsights: "The British who introduced the ph rase
in their draft of [Article 1 0] indicated that innocent passage i n the peacetime sense was what
they had in mind . . . . [T] he peacetime analogy serves to i ndicate the type of passage that
belligerents were willing to allow neutrals to grant. The type of passage contemplated is
limited by two basic criteria. It must be an innocent passage fo r bona fide purposes of
navigation rather than for escape or asylum. The passage must be innocent in the sense that
it does not p rej udice either the security interests of the coastal State, or the interests of the
opposing belligerent in preventing passage beyond the type agreed to in Article X . "
MacChesney , supra note 75 , p p . 1 8- 1 9 .
79 . Smith, supra note 6 7 , p . 1 53; Tucker, supra note 65, p . 232; NWIP 1 0-2, supra note
6 1 , section 443a, note 28; NWP 9 , supra note 6 1 , para. 7 . 3 .4 . 1 . Canada's draft manual does
not appear to recognize the right of neutral States to close the ir territorial seas to the passage
of belligerent warships. CanaJian Manual, supra note 71 , para. 1 5 1 1 (3) . The G ennan Manual
is ambiguous. In paragraph 1 1 30 of the revised draft (August 1 9 9 1 ) it states, " T he innocent
passage through neutral territorial waters of warships belonging to the parties to the conflict
shall be pennissible" (c iting Hagu e XII I , Article 1 0) , but in paragraph 1 1 33 it states, "It is
within the discretion of a neutral state to allow the passage of warships and prizes through
neutral territorial waters" (also citing Hague XIII, Article t o) . German Manual, supra note
72, pars. 1 1 30 and 1 1 33 .
8 0 . W. Michael Reisman a n d William K. Lietzau, " M oving I nternational Law from
Theory to Practi ce: The Role of Military Manuals in Effectuating the Law of Anned
Conflict, " in Robertson, supra note 9 , p. 1 at p . 7.
8 1 . See authorities cited in note 79 supra. See also Rauch , supra note 69, at pp. 40-44.
Rauch states that a lthough the 1 907 Hague Conference took up the issue of wartime passage
through neutral straits, it did not include an article in Hague X I I I on the subject. B ut he also
states that near u nifonn practice since that time j ustifies the conclusi on that "if the litto ral
States are neu tral , innocent passage of belligerent warships through international straits i n
time of wa r may be interfe red with o nl y in exceptional cases. " Id. , p . 4 4 .
82. United Kingdom v. A lbania (Coifu Channel Case) : Men"ts, Judgment, 1 949 I . C .] .
Reports, p. 4 .
8 3 . /d. , p. 28.
84. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 34, Article 16, para. 4.
85. See authoriti es cited in Ho race B. Robertso n, Jr., " Passage Through Straits : A
Right P reserved in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea," Virginia
Journal of International Law, v. 20, p. 801 at p. 803 , note 7 .
86. Note that straits joining the high seas o r an EEZ with the territorial sea of a fo reign
State are excluded by omission, although they were grouped with other straits used for
international navigation in the 1 958 Territorial Sea C onvention. Compare LOS Convention,
supra note 2, article 37, with the Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 34, article 1 6 , para. 4.
The right of nonsuspendable innocent passage for such straits is preserved by article 45, para.
2(b) of the LOS Convention, however.
87 . LOS Convention, supra note 2, article 35 (c) .
88. Id. , article 36.
89 . /d. , article 38, para. 1 .
90. Although there is no explicit provision of the Convention so stating, the result
follows from the fact that this category of straits is not included within either those govemed
by the regime of transit passage or those governed by arti cle 45 (nonsuspendable innocent
passage) .
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9 1 . LOS Convention , supra note 2, Article 45, para. 1 (a) . The most significant effect of
the non-applicability of transit passage to th is c a tegory of straits is that it closes them to
overfligh t by airc raft, and submarines must navigate on the surface and show th eir flag. Of
course, if the passage seaward of the island is truly " o f similar convenience with respect to
navigational and hydrographical charac teristics," the requirement to use such an alterna te
passage rather than the strait is of little operational significance.
92. LO S Convention, supra note 2, article 38, para . 2 (emphasis suppli ed) .
93. Id. , article 38, para. 1 (c) .
94. Civil airc raft are required to observe the rules; State airc raft, which are not bound
by the I CAO rules, " will normally comply with suc h safety measu res and will a t all times
operate with due regard for the safety of navigatio n . " LOS Convention, supra note 2, article
39 , para. 3 (a) .
95 . Id. , article 42, para. t .
96. !d. , article 42, para. 2 .
97. Id. , article 4 2 , para. 5 . S e e also , sta tement of U . K. representative explaini ng the
meaning of the proposal introduced by his delegation which eventually became article 42 .
UNCLO S J I I OR, supra note 7 7 , v. I I , Second Committee, 1 1 th Mee ting, p. 1 25 , para . 23 .
See also, LOS Convention, supra note 2, article 304 .
98. See John Norton Moore, "The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea," A mericanJoumal ifIntemational LAw, v. 74, p. 77 at p. 95
(1 980) ; William T. Burke, " S ubmerged Passage through Straits: I nterp retations of the
Proposed Law of the Sea Treaty Text , " Wasilington LAw Review, v . 52, p . 1 93 (1 977) ;
Robertson, supra note 8 5 , pp. 843-846.
99. Rauch, supra note 69, at pp. 45-46 (footnotes omitted) .
1 00. NW P 9 , supra note 6 1 , para. 7 . 3 . 5 .
l Ot . Canadian Manual, supra note 7 1 , para. 1 5 1 1 (2) . A footnote t o th e paragrap h
identifies those straits to which the righ t of transi t applies, foll owing the criteria laid dow n
in Part J I I of the LOS Convention.
1 02. See note 79 supra.
1 03 . LOS Convention, supra note 2, article 35 (c) (emphasis supplied) .
1 04. See Convention rega rding the Regime of the Strai ts , Mon treux, 20 J uly 1 936,
League of Nations Treaty Series, v . 1 73 , p . 2 1 3, reprinted in Americatl Jou mal if Intemalional
LAw, v. 31 (Supp . ) , p . 1 ( 1 937) .
1 05 . See Boundary Treaty between the Argentine Rep ublic and Chile, 2 3 J uly 1 88 1 ,
Consolidated Treaty Series (Parry) , v. 1 59 , p. 4 5 . Article 5 thereof provides, in English
transl a tion , "Magellan'S Straits are neutralized forever, and free navigation is guaran teed to
the flags of aU nations . " In the Argentina-Chile Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1 9 84, the
two coun tries reaffirmed that the Straits of Magellan "are perpetually neutralized and fre edom
of navigation is assu red to ships of all flags , " 29 Nove mber 1 984, English translation rep rinted
in International Legal Materials, v . 24, p . 1 1 ( 1 985) .
1 06 . See Treaty for the Redemption of the Sound Dues between Denmark and a number
of oth er European States, 14 March 1 857, reprinted i n English in Consolidated Treaty Series
(Parry) , v. 1 1 6 , p. 357. The United States concluded a separate bilateral treaty with Denmark
discontinuing Sound Dues for ships flying the U.S. flag. Convention for the Discontinuance
of the Sound Dues, 1 1 Ap ril 1 85 7 , U.S. Statu tes at Large, v . 1 1 , p. 7 1 9 , rep rinted i n English
in Parry , v . 1 1 6, p. 465 . I t should be noted that the I CJ is currently seised of a case concerning
navigation th rough the Belts.
1 07 . See Convention Relating to the Non-Fortification and Neutralization of the Aaland
Islands, 20 October 1 92 1 , League of Nations Treaty Series, v. 9, p . 2 1 3 , reprinted i n A merican
Joumal if Intemalio;lal LAw, v. 1 7 (Sup p .) , p. 1 ( 1 923) .
1 08 . Rauch , supra note 69, p. 53. the two authorities cited in opposition are John Norton
Moore in "The Regi me of S traits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea , " note 98 supra, at p. 1 1 1 , and Pj otr Barabolja in Modemes Seevolkmech t, published
by the Academy of Science of the USSR, translated into German by Elmar Rauch, v . 1 ,
(Baden-Baden, 1 97 8) , p . 230. Professor Moore was Vice Chairman of the U . S . delegation
to UNCLO S I I I ; General Barabolja was a senior member of the Soviet delega tion .
1 09. NWP 9, supra note 6 1 , para . 7 . 3 . 5 .
1 1 0 . Montreux Convention , supra note 1 04, articles 1 9 a n d 2 0 ; s e e also , Rauch , supra
note 69, p. 5 t .
1 1 t . See text supra notes 53-55 .
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1 1 2 . Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 34, article 24; LOS Conventio n, supra note 2,
article 33.
1 1 3 . See text, supra at notes 54 and 55.
1 1 4. Supra at note 46.
1 1 5 . Rauch, supra note 69, p . 33 .
1 1 6 . LOS Convention, supra note 2 1 , article 56.
1 1 7 . See Oxman, supra note 8, at p . 848; see also Horace B . Robertson, Jr. , "Navigation
in the Exclusive Economic Zone , " VirginiaJoumal ojIntemational LAw, v. 24, at pp. 874-875 ,
and note 52.
1 1 8. For a full discussion of this issue , which has been frequently debated in the legal
literature, see Barbara Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New LAw of
the..5ea (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1 9 89) , pp. 230-235 (cited
hereinafter as Kwiatkowska) .
1 1 9 . Elliot Richardson, "Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea," Foreign AjJairs, Spring
1 980, p. 902 at p. 9 1 6 (emphasis in original) .
1 20. Professor Oxman concludes that the addition of the phrase , " other internationally
lawful uses, etc . . . . " is the "functional substitute for the ' inter alia' in article 87 . " Oxman,
supra note 8 , at p . 837 .
1 2 1 . !d . at pp. 837-838 .
1 22 . See Oxman, supra note 8.
1 23 . Rauch, supra note 69, at p . 34, quoting from Sveriges Flotta, v. 70, pp. 8-1 1 (1 974)
(emphasis supplied) .
1 24. See, for example, UNCLOS I I I OR, supra note 77, v. XVI I , p. 54, para . 224.
125. Rauch , supra note 69, p . 36 .
1 26. Id. , p. 37.
1 27 . !d. , quoting from James Brown Scott, TI,e Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences,
The Conference oj 1 90 7 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 920) , v. I , p. 288, Report of
the Third Commission to the Conference, meeting of9 October 1 907 (Annexes) , at p. 290.
1 28 Id., p. 38 .
1 29 . Statement of the delegate of Brazil, Plenary, 1 87 th Meeting, 7 December 1 982,
UNCLOS I I I OR, supra note 77, v . XVI I , p . 40, para. 28.
1 30. Statement of the representative of Cape Verde, 1 88th Meeting, Plenary, UNCLOS
III OR, supra note 77, v. XVII , p . 62, para. 124.
1 3 1 . Statement of the representative of Uruguay, 1 92nd Meeting, Plenary, UNCLOS
I I I OR, supra note 77, v. XVI I , p. 1 20, para. 5 5 .
1 3 2 . I taly, Statement made in t h e exercise o ft h e right of reply, 7 March 1 983 , UNCLOS
I I I OR, supra note 77, v. XVI I , pp . 24 1 -242; France, Statement made in the exercise of the
right of reply, 12 May 1 983, id. , p . 241 ; United States of America, Statement made in the
exercise of the right of reply, 8 March 1 983, id. , pp. 243-244.
133. T.T.B. Koh, in Jon M . Van Dyke (ed.) , Consensus and Confrontation: The United
States and the LAw oj the Sea Convention (A Workshop of the Law of the Sea Institute, Honolulu,
Hawaii, January 9- 1 3 , 1 984) (Honolulu: LOS I nstitute, 1 985) , p . 304.
1 34. See Kwiatkowska, supra note 1 1 8 , p . 2 1 1 .
1 35 . See Kwiatkowska, id. , note 1 1 8 , p . 203 .
136. Carladian Manual, supra note 7 1 , para. 703 .
137. German Manual, supra note 72, para . 1 0 1 1 . The German Manual adds a cautionary
note that, "The rights of coastal and archipelagic states must, however, be taken into due
consideration . " Ibid. A similar cautionary statement is carried in a footnote in the Canadian
Manual . Supra note 7 1 , para. 703 , note 1 .
138. NWP 9 , supra note 6 1 , para. 7 . 3 .
1 39. L O S Convention, supra note 2 , article 5 6 , para. 3 .
1 40. L O S Convention, supra note 2 , article 76.
1 4 1 . Id. , article 77.
1 42. !d. , article 80.
1 43 . Id. , article 78.
1 44. Id. , article 60(6) .
1 45 . !d. , article 80 (incorporating article 60 mutatis m utandis) .
1 46 . Convention on the Continental Shelf, 29 April 1 958, U.N. Treaty Series, v. 499,
p. 3 1 1 , article 2.
1 47. LOS Convention, supra note 2 , article 77.
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1 48 . See Tullio Treves, "Military I nstallations, Structures, and Devices on the Seabed, "
A mericanJoumal of Int'l lAw, v. 74, p. 808, at p. 834 (cited hereinafter as Treves) .
1 49 . See id. at p. 839
1 5 0. !d. , pp. 840-846.
1 5 1 . An alternative argument legitimizing the employment of weapons or other military
devices on the seabed of the EEZ and continental shelf could be made on the basis that
military devices, such as mines and detection or surveilla nce devices are not "installations or
structures . " Some weight is added to this argument by the replacement of the nomenclature
"installations and devices" in the 1 958 Continental Shelf Conve ntion, supra note 1 46,
article 5 , by "installations and structures" in the 1 982 Convention. See Treves, supra note
1 48 , p . 841 . A second alternative basis for the same conclusion, at least for detection and
surveillance devices, can be found in the explicit provisions in articles 58 and 79 recogni zi ng
the right of all States to lay and maintain submarine cables . Id. , pp. 842-843.
152. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, i n Outer Space and
Under Water, S August 1 963, U.N. Treaty Series, v. 480, p . 43.
153. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,
1 1 February 1 97 1 , U.N. Treaty Series, v. 955, p. 1 1 5 .
1 5 4. Treaty for the Prohibition o f Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, with Additional
Protocols I and 1 1 , 1 4 February 1 967, U.N. Treaty Series, v. 634, p. 28 I .
1 5 5 . U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Interna
tional Security Affairs) , Maritime Claims Reference Manual (Washington: U.S. Dept. of
Defense, 1 989) , v. 2, p . 232 (for sale by the National Technical Information Service as DoD
2005 . 1 -M) . Although I ndonesia is the paradigm case of an archipelagic State, the archipelagic
waters claimed by a number of other States enclose ocean areas of substantial dimensions.
Examples include (with their approximate North-South and East-West dimensions in
nautical miles) : Cape Verde ( 1 44 x 1 30) , Fiji (300 x 300) , Papua-New Guinea (840 x 600) ,
Solomons (5 00 x 1 20) , Vanuatu (420 x 1 00) . Ibid. , passim . The Republic of the Philippines
is not included in this list because its archipelagic baselines, which are drawn in a manner
inconsistent with the LOS Convention, are not generally recognized as valid.
1 5 6 . Rauch, supra note 69, at p . 33.
1 57. NWP 9 , supra note 6 1 , para. 7 . 3 . 6 . The Annotated version of NWP-9 footnotes this
statement to H ague X I I I , articles 1 , 2 and 5, and NWIP 1 0-2 , para. 4 4 1 , both of which
address neutral waters in the context of the territorial sea and internal waters only.
1 58. Canadian Manual, supra note 7 1 , para . 1 509.
1 59. !d. , para. 703 . See also para. 7 06 , entitled "Passage Through Neutral Waters, " which
provides in part that, "Neutral waters are the internal waters and the territorial seas, including
straits overlapped by such waters, of states which are not participants in a conflict. "
160. Telephone conversation between the author and Co mma nder Willi a m Fenrick of
the Canadian Ministry of Defense on 4 February 1 992 .
1 6 1 . German Manual, sup ra note 72, para. 1 0 1 0 (emphasis supplied) .
1 62 . See, for example, id. , paras. 1 1 2 1 - 1 1 23, 1 1 30- 1 1 33 . It should be noted, however,
that paragraph 1 0 1 2 of the German Manual states that archipelagic States exercise full
sovereignty within their archipelagic waters, adding that, with respect to acts of naval warfare,
"The rights of . . . archipelagic states must . . . be taken into due consideration . "
1 63 . See text a t notes 73-79 supra.
1 64 . See supra, notes 75 and 76 and accompanying text.
1 6 5 . Hague X I I I , supra note 62, article 1 3 .
1 6 6 . Id. , article 25 . The Canadian draft manual recognizes the difficulty posed for the
neu tral, stating, "There is a significant possibility tha t weak neutral archipelagic states will be
unable to ensure that strong belligerents will not use their archipelagic waters as a base of
operations. H MC ships should not, however, presume that enemy warships present in neutral
archipelagic waters are using those waters as a base of operations and are hence subject to
attack unless the enemy warships pose an immediate and substantial threat or unless guidance
on the subject has been received from a higher command . " Canadian Manual, supra note
7 1 , para. 706 (6) .
1 6 7 . See supra, notes 7 7-79 and accompanying text for discussion of the neutral's rights
in this regard.
1 68 . NWP 9, supra note 6 1 , para. 7.3.6.
1 69 . LOS Convention, supra note 2 , article 44, as incorporated mutatis mutandis into the
archipelagic-State Part of the Convention by article 54.
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1 70. Id. , article 53, para. 4.
1 7 1 . Id. , para. 1 2 .
1 7 2 . Some publicists have tried t o draw a distinction between the tw o concepts o n the
basis that in Part III (straits) , the term "freedom of navigation and overflight" is used (article
38, para. 2) , whereas in Part IV (archipelagic States) , the expression " right of archipelagic sea
lanes passage " is used (article 53, para. 2). See, for example, Nugroho Wisnumurti, "Ar
chipelagic Waters and Archipelagic Sea Lanes , " in Jon M. Van Dyke, Lewis Alexander, and
Joseph R. Morgan (eds.) , International Navigation: Rocks and Shoals Ahead? (A Workshop of
the Law of the Sea Institute, 1 986) (Honolulu: Law of the Sea I nstitute, 1 988) , p. 1 98 , at
pp . 204-205 . I n view of the near identity of the provisions in the other articles of the two
Parts as welJ as incorporation of key provisions of the transit-passage regime by reference
mutatis mutandis into Part IV (article 5 4) , it is difficult to conclude that this difference in terms
has any legal significance.
1 73. LOS Convention, supra note 2 , article 53, para . 3 .
1 74 . Id. , article 54.
175. NWP 9 , supra note 61, para. 7 . 3 . 6 .
1 7 6 . Canadian Manual, supra note 7 1 , para. 1 5 1 1 (2) .
1 7 7 . NWP 9, supra note 6 1 , para. 7 . 3 . 5 .
1 7 8 . There are, o f course, exceptions such a s the Singapore-Malacca Strait.
1 7 9 . The Singapore-Malacca Strait is an exception here also .
1 80. Rear Admiral Bruce A. Harlow, JAGC, USN , "The Law of Neutrality at Sea for
the 80 ' s and Beyond , " A Paper Prepared for the Hawaii Regional Meeting of the American
Society of l nternational Law , 1 6 - 1 8 February 1 983, reproduced in UCLA Padfic Basin Law
Review, v. 3 , p. 42 at pp. 53-54. Although Admiral Harlow uses the term " neu tral waters"
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